Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance by Webber, David et al.
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
9-2020 
Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New 
Millennial Corporate Governance 
David Webber 
Boston Univeristy School of Law 
Michal Barzuza 
University of Virginia 
Quinn Curtis 
University of Virginia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Webber, Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the 
New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 Southern California Law Review 1243 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/976 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship 
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at 
Boston University School of Law. For more information, 




SHAREHOLDER VALUE(S): INDEX 
FUND ESG ACTIVISM AND THE NEW 
MILLENNIAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
MICHAL BARZUZA,* QUINN CURTIS† & DAVID H. WEBBER‡ 
Major index fund operators have been criticized as ineffective stewards 
of the firms in which they are now the largest shareholders. While scholars 
debate whether this passivity is a serious problem, index funds’ generally 
docile approach to ownership is broadly acknowledged. However, this 
Article argues that the notion that index funds are passive owners overlooks 
an important dimension in which index funds have demonstrated outspoken, 
confrontational, and effective stewardship. Specifically, we document that 
index funds have taken a leading role in challenging management and voting 
against directors in order to advance board diversity and corporate 
sustainability. We show that index funds have engaged in a pattern of 
competitive escalation in their policies on environmental, social, and 
governance (“ESG”) issues. Index funds’ confrontational and competitive 
activism on ESG issues is hard to square with their passive approach to more 
conventional corporate governance questions.  
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To explain this dichotomy in approaches, we argue that index funds are 
locked in a fierce contest to win the soon-to-accumulate assets of the 
millennial generation, who place a significant premium on social issues in 
their economic lives. With fee competition exhausted and returns irrelevant 
for index investors, signaling a commitment to social issues is one of the few 
dimensions on which index funds can differentiate themselves and avoid 
commoditization. For index funds, the threat of millennial migration to 
another fund is more significant than the threat of management retaliation. 
Furthermore, managers themselves, we argue, face intense pressure from 
their millennial employees and customers to respond to their social 
preferences. This three-dimensional millennial effect—as investors, 
customers, and employees—we argue, is an important development with the 
potential to provide a counterweight to the wealth-maximization paradigm 
of corporate governance.  
We marshal evidence for this new dynamic, situate it within the existing 
literature, and consider the implications for the debate over index funds as 
shareholders and corporate law generally. 
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[M]illennial workers were asked what the primary purpose of 
businesses should be–63 percent more of them said “improving 
society” than said “generating profit.” . . . [T]he sentiments of these 
generations will drive not only their decisions as employees but also 
as investors, with the world undergoing the largest transfer of 
wealth in history: $24 trillion from baby boomers to millennials.1  
—Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the attention of business law scholars, corporate law 
practitioners, executives, and corporate directors has turned to the role of 
giant index mutual funds as the most important shareholders in many large 
companies. Together, the “big three,” BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street 
(“SSGA”), control a staggering 25 percent of the shares of all S&P 500 
companies, and this share is growing.2 Across the pages of top law reviews, 
at prestigious roundtables, and in board rooms around the world, 
commentators have debated whether index funds, which seek only to track 
the market at low cost and not to outperform it, will nevertheless invest the 
resources necessary to be vigilant shareholders.3  
In broad strokes, the debate over index funds4 as shareholders has 
resolved into camps. Critics argue that index funds, as cost-conscious, 
passive investors, have essentially zero incentive to ensure that the 
companies they invest in are well-run.5 Since index funds hold the same 
 
 1. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs: Profit & Purpose, BLACKROCK (2019), https:// 
www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/T7WR-D 
LFH]. 
 2. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, 
Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2019).  
 3. See, e.g., id.; Jill Fisch, Asaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall 
Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2019); Ronald J. Gilson 
& Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of 
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. Rev. 863 (2013); Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case Against Passive 
Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493 (2018). 
 4. “Index funds” as a classification refers to a wide range of funds whose investments are 
mechanically linked to specified indices. In some cases, these indices may be bespoke, specialized 
products crafted for particular funds. See Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated 
Management and “Index” Investing, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 795, 830–31 (2019). We use the term to refer 
to large funds tracking broad, standardized indices, such as the S&P 500. These are the funds most 
susceptible to the incentives we lay out below.   
 5. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2050–59; Lund, supra note 3, at 18–23. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516
  
2020] SHAREHOLDER VALUE(S) 1247 
 
companies as their competitors, investing in improving the value of their 
portfolio will not provide a competitive advantage, and might upset 
managers who could in turn direct their firm’s retirement savings to other 
funds. These critics point to evidence showing that across a range of 
governance issues, index funds take a “don’t rock the boat” approach. They 
rarely challenge executives,6 lag other institutions in promoting corporate 
governance best practices, never bring shareholder proposals,7 and tend to 
side with incumbent managers in contested elections.8 Relative to their 
portfolio size, the big three have tiny corporate stewardship teams that, 
purely as a matter of personnel, can dedicate little time to individual 
companies.9  
To be sure, scholars and index fund advisors themselves identify some 
reasons that index funds might worry about firms’ success, such as advising 
fees and competition from active funds.10 Even those scholars and fund 
advisors who defend index funds’ stewardship, however, argue that index 
funds are likely to undertake only those interventions with the potential to 
have wide and significant impact on firms’ value.11 Furthermore, both sides 
largely agree that index funds have disincentives to actively promote 
 
 6. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the 
Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1007, 1025 (2020) (highlighting index funds’ passivity in monitoring management political spending). 
 7. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2040 (finding that the big three do not submit 
shareholder proposals).  
 8. Id. at 2094; see also Alon Brav et al., Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights: How 
Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 18–19 (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper No. 18-16, 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3101473 [https://perma.cc/T2XJ-3KW9] 
(finding index funds more likely than other funds to vote against hedge fund nominees in contested 
elections). 
 9. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2076–83. 
 10. See, e.g., Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 3, at 33 (“If investors believe that 
passive funds cannot offer a better rate of return than active funds, they will flee to active funds, and vice 
versa.”); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be 
Shareholders 1 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-39, 2019), http 
s://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295098 [https://perma.cc/XH9A-P3PY] (“With 
regard to the highest profile contests that will likely affect firm value, the strong direct incentives should 
assure that the Big Three will vote intelligently.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 3, at 18 (arguing that index funds 
“focus on issues with a broad market impact, such as potential corporate governance reforms, that have 
the potential to reduce the underperformance and mispricing of portfolio companies.”); Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 10, at 3–4. 
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governance improvements against management interests.12 While the debate 
is vigorous, there is reasonable consensus that index funds are mostly 
reticent, largely docile shareholders, except maybe with respect to 
interventions with a dramatic effect on firms’ value.  
This Article makes several contributions to the literature. We first show 
that the consensus view of index fund stewardship is both factually and 
theoretically incomplete: when it comes to environmental, social, and 
governance (“ESG”) issues, index funds are far from docile. With respect to 
these salient social issues, this Article shows that index funds boldly 
challenge managers, vote out directors, and demonstrate vocal leadership in 
thought and deed—activities that are sharply at odds with the conventional 
account of index fund passivity. Importantly, index fund activism on these 
issues is not just cheap talk, rather, they targeted problematic firms 
systematically, voted against their board members and generated notable 
effects.13 In 2017, for example, after State Street announced its objection to 
all-male boards in its portfolio firms, the index fund voted against 400 of the 
476 firms in its portfolio that did not have any female directors. By the end 
of 2018, more than 300 of these firms added a female director. Accordingly, 
that in July 2019 the last all-male board in the S&P 500 added a woman to 
its ranks reflects the outspoken and confrontational efforts of the big three, 
and BlackRock and State Street in particular.  
Our second contribution is to show that, in contrast to conventional 
wisdom, funds compete aggressively with each other in escalating their ESG 
policies. For example, in pressing for increased representation of women on 
 
 12. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2037 (“When index fund managers face qualitative 
stewardship decisions, we show that they have incentives to be excessively deferential—relative to what 
would best serve the interests of their own beneficial investors—toward the preferences and positions of 
the managers of portfolio companies.”); Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 3, at 65 (“One 
concern is that potential business ties between sponsors and companies’ management may affect passive 
funds’ voting behavior. . . . These services create the risk that Vanguard and Fidelity will vote the shares 
of their funds in favor of management rather than in the best interests of the fund shareholders, in order 
to curry favor from management and win or retain 401(k) plan business.”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 
10, at 47–48 (“A second, long recognized source of conflicts is the desire of stock-pickers for investment 
advisers to maintain cordial relationship [sic] with management of their portfolio companies . . . by not 
casting votes against management when voting against management would enhance firm value, they do 
so at the expense of shareholders-at-large.”). 
 13. Notably, these funds challenged management by withholding votes from directors in 
uncontested elections. Thus, by focusing on contested elections and shareholder proposals the literature 
has missed funds’ most significant form of activism—withholding votes from directors in uncontested 
elections. 
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corporate boards, index funds have voted against directors, proactively 
publicized these votes, and used the media to highlight their confrontations 
with management. State Street and BlackRock have engaged in a pattern of 
escalating demands with respect to board diversity. As a result, these asset 
managers are currently well ahead of other corporate governance institutions, 
like Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), in pressing this issue. 
Similarly, while efforts on the environmental front were initiated with a 
general request for companies to address “sustainability,” BlackRock has 
recently announced a significant push related to climate change, including 
divesting its active funds from coal stocks.14 While index funds are generally 
thought to keep a low profile to avoid backlash from managers or regulators, 
we show that funds have pressed ahead despite political backlash to some of 
these interventions. Consequently, we argue that on ESG issues, index funds 
are far from reticent shareholders—they are perhaps more active and 
influential than institutional shareholders have ever been. 
Our third contribution is to offer an explanation of why index funds’ 
actions with respect to ESG issues bear so little resemblance to their 
activities on more traditional matters of shareholder stewardship. The former 
cannot be explained within the literature’s existing theoretical framework, 
which approaches shareholder stewardship largely as a trade-off between 
asset management fees and the fear of management retaliation. While index 
funds might fear management retaliation, we show that a more potent 
concern is on the horizon: in the next two decades, somewhere between $12 
trillion and $30 trillion will pass to the millennial generation in what 
BlackRock CEO Larry Fink has called “the largest transfer of wealth in 
history.”15 This staggering wealth, which dwarfs the cumulative assets under 
management of the big three, is the prize sought by asset managers across 
 
 14. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 15. Fink, supra note 1 (“In the years to come, the sentiments of these generations will drive not 
only their decisions as employees but also as investors, with the world undergoing the largest transfer of 
wealth in history: $24 trillion from baby boomers to millennials.”); see also Gillian Tett, Millennial Heirs 
to Change Investment Landscape, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018) (citing U.S. Trust estimate that $12 trillion 
in assets will pass to millennials over the next decade, and Deloitte estimate that $24 trillion will be 
transferred over the next fifteen years), https://www.ft.com/content/59f6562a-786d-11e8-af48-
190d103e32a4 [https://perma.cc/F2R6-U5C7]; Liz Skinner, The Great Wealth Transfer Is Coming, 
Putting Advisers at Risk, INV. NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150713/ 
FEATURE/150719999/the-great-wealth-transfer-is-coming-putting-advisers-at-risk [https://perma.cc/6F 
JE-MB49] (“Over the next 30 years, an epic $30 trillion will be passed down from baby boomers to 
Generation X to millennials.”). 
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the economy as the millennial generation begins to enter its wealth 
accumulation phase. To win the millennial generation, index funds have 
turned their attention not simply to share price—the conventional marker of 
shareholder value—but to the social issues that millennial investors care 
about: shareholder values.  
When it comes to investment preferences, millennials are markedly 
different than their predecessors. The literature and market research 
unanimously concludes that, compared to prior generations, millennials are 
less interested in investment returns and more interested in their investments 
reflecting their social values.16 It is no surprise that index funds are out front 
in the race to demonstrate a commitment to millennial social values: with 
prices for index funds already cut to the bone, and investment performance 
an irrelevant consideration for index investors, index funds must seek out 
differentiation in the market where they can find it. Using their voting power 
to promote their investors’ social values, and doing so publicly and loudly, 
is a way for these funds, which otherwise risk becoming commodities, to 
give millennial investors a reason to choose them.  
That index funds are chasing millennial wealth explains their 
aggressive, competitive approach to ESG issues.17 First, we argue, it is in the 
interest of index funds to not only respond to existing shareholder 
preferences for social values, but to find new issues that can be made salient 
and become first movers on those as well. Second and relatedly, we show 
that funds caught flat-footed tend to respond with more aggressive policies 
than funds that acted earlier. Thus, after State Street scored a global sensation 
with its Fearless Girl statue on Wall Street and announced that it would vote 
against directors of firms with no female directors, BlackRock announced 
that it would expect all boards to have a minimum of two female directors. 
And it did not end there—State Street followed with more stringent voting 
policies, and BlackRock then responded with an even more aggressive 
 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. In developing this argument, our main goal is to explain the observed divergent approaches of 
major index fund operators between activism on conventional issues of corporate governance and 
activism on social issues. Section IV.A, infra highlights some reasons that index funds may be particularly 
susceptible to these forces. For example, they cannot compete on returns or drop problematic companies 
from their portfolios. But in focusing on large index funds we do not mean to argue that active asset 
managers are immune to these concerns. Competition for millennial wealth may well motivate similar 
social activism among large active asset managers in the future.   
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approach, voting against boards at firms with which they had not previously 
engaged.18  
Third, while funds must still be wary of management backlash, this 
Article shows that investors’ preference for social values is a critical factor 
that will act as a counterweight to those forces. Eventually, managers—who 
face pressure on social issues not just from index fund shareholders, but from 
employees and customers as well—will have to respond. For example, 
following its explosive scandal, Papa Johns’ income from selling pizza 
dropped from $22.8 million to $4.6 million.19 Indeed, on August 19, 2019, 
the Business Roundtable, a group of CEOs of the largest corporations in the 
world, announced that they “share a fundamental commitment to all of our 
stakeholders,” including customers, employees, and communities.20 In 
invoking the stakeholder value theory, the titans of mainstream capitalism 
suggest that changing shareholder values are having an effect on firms.  
The importance of these developments should not be understated. What 
we are witnessing is an emergence of a new framework for corporate 
governance that has already reshaped hundreds of boards. The consequences 
of this shift are just beginning to be realized. In response to competition for 
money to manage, the largest pools of assets in our economy have turned 
their power as shareholders to advancing investors’ social agenda. Far from 
being asleep at the switch as shareholder stewards, these funds are 
reconceiving what it means to act in shareholders’ interests. Similarly, in 
response to pressure from their millennial employees and consumers, 
managers across firms conform in advancing social goals.  
Our fourth and final contribution is to begin to consider the impact of 
these developments on corporate law. While corporate scholars are 
acquainted with theories of the firm that ask managers to subordinate 
shareholder value to the interests of other constituencies under some 
circumstances, the consequences of a world in which shareholders 
themselves have strong preferences for social responsibility and are 
positioned to act on those preferences through the traditional levers of 
corporate power are less explored. Already, the Trump administration has 
 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Our Commitment, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommit 
ment [https://perma.cc/N338-X3H4]. 
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pushed back against funds’ efforts to promote social values in the context of 
retirement plans. However, we argue that if shareholders own the firm, then 
their preferences, broadly construed, should be taken seriously.21 
*** 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe the existing 
debate over the role of index funds as reticent shareholders. In Part II, we 
offer contrasting evidence of index funds’ aggressive approach to social 
issues and argue that the existing account of index funds’ incentives cannot 
explain what we observe. In Part III, we establish that millennial investors 
have the potential future wealth to move markets and that social values drive 
many of their economic decisions. In Part IV, we analyze index funds’ 
incentives in light of the new millennial economy, show that funds face 
fierce competition to cater to millennials’ preferences, assert that index 
funds’ observed activism is explained by the pursuit of millennial investors’ 
assets, and argue that this is an essential extension of the existing literature. 
In Part V, we discuss the implications of this new approach to corporate 
governance.  
I.  THE DEBATE OVER INDEX FUNDS AS SHAREHOLDERS 
As corporations have replaced defined benefit pension plans with 
defined contribution retirement plans (for example, 401(k) plans), huge 
pools of assets have accumulated in mutual funds. These funds, which offer 
simple and low-cost diversification across a portfolio of many companies, 
have grown by more than 50 percent since 2010.22 As how workers save for 
retirement evolves, a second transformation is underway in the mutual fund 
industry: mutual fund assets are now largely flowing to index funds that seek 
only to match the performance of the market at the lowest possible cost, 
rather than to actively managed funds that seek to beat the market through 
skilled stock picking by a portfolio manager.23 This is a significant 
 
 21. For a more traditional, skeptical take on ESG investing, see Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert 
H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing 
by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 385–86 (2020). 
 22. See  INV. COMPANY INST., 2019 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 11 (2019), https://www. 
ici.org/pdf/2019_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRF6-45DT].  
 23. Kevin McDevitt & Michael Schramm, 2018 U.S. Fund Flows Trends in 5 Charts, 
MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.morningstar.com/blog/2019/01/28/us-fund-flows-trends.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/CTR5-NUGP]. 
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development because a small set of index funds have become, by dollar 
value, the most important shareholders in the capital markets. Currently, the 
largest index fund operators, Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street, hold 
about 25 percent of the voting power in all S&P 500 companies.24  
It is axiomatic that firms are owned by their shareholders, but the 
practical meaning of this ownership relationship has evolved considerably 
over time. For decades, the dominant paradigm of corporate governance was 
the Berle and Means view of dispersed, rationally passive shareholders at the 
mercy of managers who exercised de facto control over both the operation 
of the firm and the membership of the board of directors.25 Over the last 
several decades, this paradigm has been displaced by successive waves of 
financial and legal innovation, with dramatic consequences for corporate 
governance. The leveraged buyout wave of the 1980s, enabled by the 
creation of markets for high-yield debt instruments, disrupted the all-too-
comfortable position of managers by activating the market for corporate 
control. The subsequent development of the poison pill created a substantial 
obstacle to buyouts, but led to the rise of shareholder activist campaigns, 
largely initiated by hedge funds that sought to profit by influencing firm 
strategy rather than by buying the firm entirely. Modern corporations operate 
under the threat of these hedge fund interventions. 
Now, the realities of firm ownership have evolved further to put index 
funds at the forefront. Hedge fund activism depends critically on persuading 
other shareholders that the hedge fund’s preferred strategy is a good one. 
With a relatively small number of funds holding large stakes in many of the 
largest firms, the big three have become the pivotal shareholders across the 
market. The question of the moment in corporate law is thus how index funds 
will wield their considerable power.  
A.  THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF MUTUAL FUNDS 
It is helpful to review the structure of mutual funds, whether index or 
actively managed. We will first give a very brief overview of mutual funds 
and their advisors, distinguish active and index funds, discuss how mutual 
 
 24. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2033. 
 25. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516
  
1254 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1243 
funds vote their proxies, and examine the consequences of those decisions 
for firms.  
1.  The Institutional Structure of Mutual Funds  
Mutual funds are pools of assets with a distinct legal identity and unique 
regulatory regime. Mutual funds take in assets from investors and issue 
shares in return. These assets are invested in any number of securities, but 
most mutual funds invest in the common stock of public companies.26 
Mutual fund investors can redeem their shares at any time. Redemption 
means that the mutual fund must return cash to investors equivalent to their 
pro rata share of the fund’s portfolio at its then-current value. Unlike with an 
operating company, investors in mutual funds do not need to find a buyer for 
their shares; they can simply ask for their investment back, and the mutual 
fund has a legal obligation to return it.27  
Each mutual fund is a separate legal entity with its own board of 
directors, but, as a practical matter, mutual funds are operated by complexes 
that manage multiple funds.28 We generally associate these complexes with 
mutual fund operation: Vanguard, Fidelity, T. Rowe Price, and others. 
Complexes may sponsor hundreds of mutual funds offering different 
investment goals and management styles. Mutual fund complexes make 
money by charging advisory fees to manage the assets in the fund. These 
fees are determined as a percentage of the assets under management and 
generally do not depend on how the fund performs. While hedge fund 
managers reap huge rewards when their funds have strong returns, mutual 
funds have a far tamer compensation profile as a result of statutory limits on 
investment advisor incentive.29 Specifically, while hedge fund managers can 
charge fees that allow them to share in the appreciation of the portfolio, 
mutual funds can only charge such fees if they also refund fees should there 
be a shortfall.30 In practice, most mutual funds simply charge a percentage 
 
 26. INV. COMPANY INST., supra note 22, at 59.  
 27. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(31), Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789, 794–95 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (2018)).  
 28. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee 
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 92 (2010). 
 29. For an overview of the regulation of compensation, see Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Protecting 
Consumer Investors by Facilitating “Improved Performance” Competition, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV 1, 28–
31.  
 30. See id. at 27.  
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of assets under management. As a result, mutual fund managers are rewarded 
for managing large funds, but not directly for performance.  
There are two broad classes of mutual funds: actively managed (or 
“active”) funds that seek to beat the market by picking stocks that are likely 
to perform better than average and index funds that seek only to track the 
market at the lowest possible cost. While both types of mutual funds charge 
fees as a percentage of assets and not based on performance, active funds 
nevertheless have powerful incentives to worry about the performance of 
their funds. Competition for assets is the primary mode of competition 
among active funds. Active funds sell the capacity to beat the market, and 
research has shown that active funds that outperform the market are likely to 
grow.31 Since fees are a percentage of fund assets, large funds generate more 
revenue. As a result, active fund managers care deeply about performance. 
In particular, active funds seek strong performance relative to other active 
funds of similar investing styles. An active fund that posts a strong year can 
expect a dramatic influx of assets to manage and—even holding the fee 
constant as a percentage of assets—will generate more revenue the following 
year. 
The same performance incentive does not occur in index funds. Index 
fund operators care about their funds being as large as possible, because, like 
active funds, they will generate more revenue from asset-based fees. 
However, index funds do not seek to beat the market, so they cannot grow 
large via eye-popping performance. Instead, index funds compete largely on 
price. Since all index funds that track the same index sell the same portfolio, 
tracking the index in question at the lowest possible price is the most 
important means of attracting new investments.  
Both index funds and actively managed funds have the power to vote 
the shares they hold in their portfolios on behalf of their investors. In fact, 
the large pools of assets these funds represent mean that these funds have—
at least potentially—considerable influence over companies in which they 
invest.32 Since 2003, the SEC has required that funds disclose how they vote 
their proxies.33 Funds have responded by voting their proxies at nearly every 
 
 31. See Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589, 1595 
(1998). 
 32. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 886. 
 33. Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 3, at 44. 
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opportunity.34 Given the diversity of their portfolios, mutual funds cast 
ballots on a large number of issues, and mutual fund complexes, with several 
hundred funds under management, cast thousands of votes.35 Voting policies 
are largely set at the complex level, and individual funds—which have legal 
authority to vote their shares—may delegate that authority to a central 
authority within the mutual fund complex.36 An industry has sprung up 
selling proxy-advisory services to help asset managers manage voting on 
numerous complex issues.37  
As major shareholders, mutual funds’ activities as shareholders have 
the potential to strongly influence management, but the degree to which 
mutual funds have an incentive to invest in using “voice”38 to enhance 
corporate performance is unclear. Given the number of votes mutual funds 
cast, a debate—considered in detail below—has sprung up around whether 
mutual funds invest sufficiently to cast informed votes.  
2.  The Promise and Pitfalls of Mutual Funds as Corporate Monitors  
The significant influx of invested assets into mutual funds over the last 
several decades raised hopes that mutual funds might overcome the problems 
of dispersed, rationally disinterested shareholders that tended to concentrate 
power in the hands of managers.39 For several reasons, mutual funds, 
whether index or active, did not become the fierce advocates for shareholder 
interests that some had hoped, at least not with respect to the traditional 
concerns of corporate governance. The reasons for this are slightly different 
with respect to active funds and index funds. While there are many common 
factors, it is worth laying out the reasons why active funds are often, in the 
words of Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon, “reticent”40 when it comes to 
engaging in controversial corporate governance issues. 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. at 44–45. 
 37. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy 
Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 650 (2009). 
 38. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Exit, Voice, and Liability: Legal Dimensions of 
Organizational Structure 6 (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (characterizing the ability to sell, 
engage management, and sue for breach of fiduciary duties as “exit,” “voice,” and “liability” in corporate 
law). 
 39. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 25. 
 40. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 889.  
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The reticence of active mutual funds is best understood in contrast to 
the aggressive stance of activist hedge funds when it comes to challenging 
management. It is common for a hedge fund to take a concentrated stake in 
a struggling company and use the voting power associated with that stake to 
influence the company’s directors to make changes or to run a proxy 
campaign to replace the board. If the market responds positively to these 
changes, which it often does, the hedge fund stands to profit as the value of 
its stake increases. In principle, an actively managed mutual fund could 
similarly profit by investing in a firm and using the tools of shareholder 
control to improve that firm’s operations, thereby increasing its stock price 
and increasing the value of the fund’s portfolio. But the realities of active 
mutual fund management render this type of intervention only rarely 
attractive.  
First, whatever benefits actively managed mutual funds would obtain 
from such a strategy would be shared by all other owners of the firm. This 
is—of course—true for activist hedge funds as well, but the effect of this 
dilution is more acute for active funds for two reasons. To begin, other active 
funds with the same investment style are likely to have similar stakes in the 
same company. By investing in improving the governance of one such 
company, the active fund benefits not just other market participants, but its 
direct competitors. Since active funds care about relative performance, this 
is a significant disincentive to activism.41 To be sure, the fund could 
overweight the stock in its portfolio, but its differential benefit relative to 
other funds with similar stakes would nevertheless be diluted. This is related 
to the second obstacle to this strategy, which is that legal limits on 
concentrated ownership for mutual funds restrict the degree to which they 
can focus their holdings on a particular company. Since mutual funds must 
be diversified,42 their stake in any particular company must inevitably be 
fairly small, meaning the profits from intervention will not only be shared 
with the shareholders in the target company, but diluted by the other holdings 
in the fund’s portfolio. Hedge funds are free to take much more concentrated 
stakes, and therefore are less susceptible to this problem.  
Second, and probably most importantly, the fee structure of mutual 
funds provides weaker incentives for this type of intervention. Since hedge 
 
 41. Id. at 889–90. 
 42. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(b), Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789, 800 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (2018)).  
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fund managers typically receive 20 percent of the portfolio growth they 
generate, they have strong incentives to invest in identifying and pursuing 
value-creating activist opportunities. Mutual funds, which benefit from 
strong performance only by increasing assets under management after 
posting strong performance, have less powerful incentives, and so are less 
apt to pursue challenging strategies. Put more bluntly, asset managers with 
the ability to conduct value-increasing activist campaigns are likely to find 
the hedge fund sector a more lucrative place to apply their skills.  
These obstacles do not mean that actively managed mutual funds are 
indifferent to low-quality companies. Rather, in ordinary circumstances, an 
actively managed mutual fund has a far easier remedy than to challenge 
management: simply sell the stock. By selling stocks of companies with poor 
management, actively managed mutual funds increase the chance of their 
portfolio beating the market without incurring the cost of engaging in an 
activist campaign. Moreover, to the extent active mutual funds are better than 
their competitors at finding such companies, the benefits of selling will not 
be shared in the way that the benefits of activism are.43  
B.  INDEX FUNDS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORY  
Many obstacles to shareholder activism in active mutual funds apply to 
index funds as well, including diversified portfolios, fees based on assets 
under management, and regulatory obstacles. However, index funds differ in 
that they cannot sell a stock just because it appears likely to underperform. 
Index funds sell market exposure to a particular index and therefore are not 
in the business of picking and choosing stocks. Even if the portfolio manager 
is confident that a stock will underperform, index fund investors are locked 
in. Thus, index funds lack that “exit” option that dominates for active funds 
and have very long-term time horizons for stocks they hold. Perhaps the 
absence of an exit option, the long-term horizon, and the enormous (and 
growing) shareholder power of index funds mean that they will be less 
reticent than active funds.44 Whether this is the case is the subject of an 
ongoing debate, described in some detail below.  
 
 43. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 893. 
 44. Another reason to think, a priori, that index funds may be effective stewards is that by holding 
the market, index funds internalize cross-externalities between companies in their portfolio. This might 
incentivize index managers to put pressure on firms to reduce externalities that are harmful to the portfolio 
in aggregate. See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2020). 
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1.  Obstacles to Effective Index Fund Governance  
The absence of an option to sell might increase index funds’ willingness 
to use voice, but index funds also differ from active funds in that they do not 
compete on performance, at least not with other index funds.45 All index 
funds that track the same index will deliver performance that is all but 
identical before fees, with fees being the primary differentiator among funds. 
Index funds cannot, even in principle, outperform the market and can only 
outperform their competitors by charging less. Any expenditure on informed 
shareholder voting increases costs with no direct competitive benefits, and—
as with active funds—any improvements in companies due to these 
expenditures would be shared among competitive index funds holding the 
same companies.46 There is simply no competitive edge against other index 
funds that can be gained by investing in governance.47  
Ensuring that companies in the index perform well may increase the 
return of the index as a whole and thus increase assets under management 
and the fees that index funds collect, but the economic significance of this is 
minimal. A fund with a 0.1 percent fee and a very large 5 percent ownership 
stake would invest only $1,000 to attain a $20 million enhancement to the 
value of a portfolio company.48 There is simply not enough direct impact on 
fund advisor income to support significant shareholder activism based solely 
on assets under management.  
Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst note that index funds have a more 
conventional agency problem. Many of the largest fund managers also have 
significant 401(k) practices that involve selling retirement plan services to 
companies who might be the subject of activist campaigns. Challenging 
management at these firms could risk these lucrative contracts. Indeed, 
empirical evidence supports such a claim.49 But even absent a direct client 
 
 45. Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 3, at 23, argue that index funds face 
competition from active funds.  
 46. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2037. 
 47. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate 
Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151, 1168–72 (2019); Sean J. Griffith, Opt-in Stewardship: Toward an Optimal 
Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority 6 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
463/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3404298 [https://perma.cc/CD9H 
-GZDZ]. 
 48. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2047. 
 49. Id. at 2063; see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
520, 602 (1990) (noting that the risk to 401(k) business could be a constraint on fund activism). 
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relationship, these business relationships might motivate index fund advisors 
to take a more management-friendly approach to corporate governance 
issues generally, even without engaging in favoritism directed at particular 
firms.50 
Finally, it should be noted that the other obstacles to active fund 
activism apply to index funds with equal force. They hold diversified 
portfolios and so lack the large stakes needed to support profitable activism, 
and their fee structure gives their advisors little incentive to find value-
creating activist opportunities.  
2.  Potential Incentives for Index Fund Governance 
It may seem that index funds have no incentive to spend on exercising 
shareholder power, but this is not strictly true. There are some countervailing 
factors that might induce index funds to engage in activism and invest in 
governance. This Section analyzes some of the arguments suggesting that 
index funds have incentives to invest in activism.  
First, mutual funds own shares on behalf of their investors, and have 
fiduciary duties to exercise their ownership rights in the interest of 
investors.51 The SEC has specifically encouraged that these fiduciary duties 
encompass a duty to vote their shares.52 As noted above, mutual funds 
generally do vote their proxies. 
Second, index funds, which have become shareholders of enormous 
significance in recent years, may fear regulation and be at pains to 
demonstrate that they are responsible stewards as a means of forestalling 
government intervention.53 By demonstrating that they are engaged owners 
and “good citizens” through investments in oversight and stewardship, index 
funds might make it less likely that they would become the subjects of costly 
regulation. Of course, index funds might invite regulatory scrutiny by being 
too aggressive as well, so avoiding regulation might motivate funds to take 
 
 50. Id. at 2064. 
 51. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 sec. 20, § 36, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 
1413, 1428–30 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2018)). 
 52. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,563, 6,565 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 
270, 274). 
 53. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2130. 
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relatively safe, pro-management stances, even as they demonstrate their 
diligence by reliably voting their proxies.  
Index funds might face competitive pressure from non-index funds as 
well. Jill Fisch, Asaf Hamdani, and Steven Davidoff Solomon dispute the 
notion that index funds have no incentive to worry about firm performance.54 
They argue that index funds compete not only against other index funds, but 
also against actively managed funds generally. That is, if index funds begin 
to lag behind active funds, assets will flow out of index funds collectively, 
reducing the revenue they generate. Ensuring that companies are well-run in 
general helps mitigate the potential ability of active fund managers to beat 
the market, ensuring that index investing remains a viable strategy.  
This important argument surely captures a competitive dynamic that is 
true as far as it goes, but how far it goes is quite unclear. First, while index 
funds might collectively fear a flight to active fund management, engaging 
in stewardship to prevent such a flight would nevertheless be subject to a 
classic collective action problem. That is, an investment an individual fund 
made in preventing the outperformance of active funds by improving 
corporate governance would produce benefits shared among all index funds. 
Under such circumstances, we would expect index funds to systematically 
underinvest in governance. Secondly, the large index fund managers also 
provide active management services.55 While outflows from index funds 
would be undesirable from the point of view of these managers, they would 
nevertheless be positioned to capture at least a portion of funds moving to 
active management.  
It is also notable that mutual funds are able to free ride on the efforts of 
activist hedge funds who have more powerful incentives.56 Activist hedge 
funds take large stakes, but index funds’ holdings are larger still and—as 
neutral, sophisticated parties—the position of index funds in proxy contests 
is influential. As such, index funds are increasingly the swing voters in 
contested director elections and other activist interventions. On the one hand, 
the ability to free ride means that index funds’ investment in governance can 
be lower than it otherwise might—perhaps much lower. On the other hand, 
their role as swing voters raises the stakes on index funds getting it right and 
 
 54. Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 3, at 32. 
 55. Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 20. 
 56. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 908. 
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means that a pro-management bias from index funds could be damaging to 
shareholder value in macro terms.  
Without taking sides in the debate over index fund activism, it is clear 
that there are reasons that index funds might not engage in optimal oversight 
of the companies they own. That is, they may invest less in oversight, 
stewardship, and governance than the ultimate owners of the index funds, 
their investors, would prefer. Index funds might also be biased toward 
management as a means of keeping the peace with managers or regulators 
who might be influenced by regulators. We need not settle this debate in 
order to characterize the new dimension our argument brings to the table.  
C.  INDEX FUNDS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CONVENTIONAL 
VIEW OF PRACTICE 
While there is some dispute as to the incentives that index funds have 
to invest in corporate governance, there is relative agreement that funds have 
limited incentives to intervene in corporate governance and can be expected 
to do so only when the economic benefits in terms of improved firm value 
are large, and the activism is not firm-specific so that the index fund can 
benefit from economies of scale.57 Thus, index funds can be expected to 
focus on market-wide activism and primarily engage on issues that have 
significant potential to improve the value of companies. Confrontations with 
management will likely be avoided wherever possible to reduce the risk of 
backlash.58 
 
 57. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 13. 
 58. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2037 (“When index fund managers face qualitative 
stewardship decisions, we show that they have incentives to be excessively deferential—relative to what 
would best serve the interests of their own beneficial investors—toward the preferences and positions of 
the managers of portfolio companies.”); Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 3, at 65 (“One 
concern is that potential business ties between sponsors and companies’ management may affect passive 
funds’ voting behavior. Commentators have identified some of the potential conflicts arising from 
business ties between public companies and fund sponsors. For example, . . . Vanguard and Fidelity 
provide extensive services to employer-sponsored 401(k) plans. These services create the risk that 
Vanguard and Fidelity will vote the shares of their funds in favor of management rather than in the best 
interests of the fund shareholders, in order to curry favor from management and win or retain 401(k) plan 
business.”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 47–48 (“A second, long recognized source of conflicts is 
the desire of stock-pickers for investment advisers to maintain cordial relationship [sic] with management 
of their portfolio companies . . . by not casting votes against management when voting against 
management would enhance firm value, they do so at the expense of shareholders-at-large.”). 
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With respect to conventional types of corporate governance activism, 
index fund practice is largely consistent with this theoretical picture, as 
documented in a recent, comprehensive overview of index fund activism by 
Bebchuk and Hirst.59 Put briefly, the evidence shows that index funds vote 
their proxies, but rarely initiate shareholder action, and have small—but 
growing—corporate governance operations. The current debate turns less on 
disagreement about the facts on the ground when it comes to index fund 
corporate governance practices than it does on the harder-to-settle question 
of whether these practices are sufficient. 
The big three index fund operators have surprisingly small corporate 
governance teams. BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street have forty-five, 
twenty-one, and twelve personnel working on corporate governance issues, 
respectively.60 Of course, it is not possible to specify what appropriate 
staffing levels ought to be, but it is striking that firms that each hold more 
than seventeen thousand portfolio companies and control 20 percent of the 
S&P 500 have fewer than one hundred individuals charged with dealing with 
corporate governance issues at those companies. As Bebchuk and Hirst note, 
this amounts to between one-sixth and one-half of a day of an individual’s 
time per portfolio company per year.61  
Bebchuk and Hirst find that the big three index fund operators did not 
bring a single shareholder proposal under 14a-8 in the five years from 2014–
2018 when nearly 1,500 such proposals were made, many of which the index 
funds supported.62 The big three index fund complexes are not averse to 
supporting these proposals, particularly when they pertain to important 
matters of corporate governance.63 And shareholder proposals are quite 
inexpensive to initiate; they are often undertaken by small investors or even 
individuals. Many portfolio companies have not yet adopted the corporate 
governance arrangements that the big three advocate, yet the large index 
investors have not seen fit to initiate the low-cost and effective intervention 
of a shareholder proposal, even once. This is consistent with the view that 
index funds generally have incentives to be reticent when it comes to 
interventions in corporate governance.  
 
 59. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2030. 
 60. Id. at 2077 tbl.1.  
 61. Id. at 2080 tbl.3. 
 62. Id. at 2103–04. 
 63. Id.  
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Index funds are also reticent when it comes to individual director 
nominations. Bebchuk and Hirst find that the big three did not directly 
nominate any directors to the boards of portfolio companies, nor do they find 
evidence that the big three highlight efforts to appoint specific directors in 
the stewardship reports.64 It may be that index fund operators work quietly 
with nominating committees to encourage particular choices for director 
nominations, but if this is the case, the big three have not chosen to highlight 
these efforts publicly, even as they are at pains to demonstrate their 
stewardship efforts in other contexts.  
Index funds tend to be followers rather than leaders in their published 
guidelines for corporate governance. Many routine matters are outsourced to 
proxy advisory services, with funds spending their limited resources on 
issues only when ISS or Glass Lewis identify potential problems.65 While 
each of the big three publishes detailed voting guidelines, they are mutually 
similar and similar to the ISS and Glass Lewis guidelines in most respects.66  
There are countervailing points of evidence, though. The big three 
consistently point to engagement efforts that occur directly with managers 
of portfolio companies. As major shareholders, the big three are in a position 
to access management directly and get their attention. Index fund sponsors 
point to these activities as their preferred channel of stewardship and a basis 
for eschewing shareholder proposals. While these activities are largely 
undocumented, making their extent and influence on managers difficult to 
observe, it is clear that the low staffing of the big three as applied to corporate 
governance functionally limits the scope of these activities.  
*** 
The above evidence reflects index funds’ limited incentives to engage 
in conventional activism, but the existing literature does not address an 
important dimension of index fund activism that is largely inconsistent with 
this general characterization: as the next Part will demonstrate, index funds 
have been leaders in demanding gender diversity on the boards of their 
portfolio companies.  
 
 64. Id. at 2098. 
 65. Lund, supra note 3, at 24. 
 66. Id. at 25. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516
  
2020] SHAREHOLDER VALUE(S) 1265 
 
II.  INDEX FUNDS AS SOCIAL ACTIVISTS 
Contrary to the existing account of index fund passivity, there are areas 
where index funds have in fact been aggressive in challenging management, 
withholding votes from unsatisfactory directors and changing corporate 
practice. This Part documents extensive index fund activism around board 
diversity and other social issues. We review in detail how these efforts differ 
from index funds’ engagements on more conventional dimensions of 
shareholder activism. We consider and dismiss elements of the current 
theoretical framework that have been offered to explain why index funds 
engage in significantly more aggressive activist behavior related to board 
diversity. Lastly, we conclude that the theoretical framework needs 
expansion.  
A.  INDEX FUND ACTIVISM ON SOCIAL ISSUES 
Calls for public companies to increase the gender diversity of their 
boards of directors are not new, but in recent years, calls for diversification 
have come not just from social activists, but from investors as well, and 
companies have responded. In light of the foregoing discussion, it is 
surprising that index funds have been at the forefront of this movement. 
Despite their reticence in other areas of corporate governance, index funds 
have been vocal and aggressive in demanding more diverse boards, even 
more so than other corporate governance players like ISS or actively 
managed funds. As the following Parts show, index funds have engaged in 
broadly publicized campaigns, publicly announced votes against specific 
companies, adopted policies of voting against boards that fail to diversify, 
and have pressed increasingly stringent diversity requirements.  
1.  Index Funds’ Outspoken Support for Gender Diversity 
Existing accounts of index fund activism are factually correct that index 
funds are typically reticent followers when it comes to corporate governance 
reforms, but when the subject matter of activism turns from conventional 
governance reforms to demands for increased gender diversity on boards, 
index funds have been notably outspoken, both in communications directed 
primarily at corporate managers and in marketing efforts directed at the 
general public. While funds’ ESG efforts have been occasionally noted in 
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the literature,67 we show that funds’ marketing efforts and public 
pronouncements have been accompanied by aggressive, meaningful action.  
By far the highest profile public action around board diversity was State 
Street’s “Fearless Girl” statue, commissioned as part of a marketing 
campaign conceived by advertising agency McCann New York.68 The statue, 
a defiant young girl, was placed opposite the Charging Bull statue on 
Bowling Green in the Manhattan Financial District so as to appear to be 
staring it down. The campaign was meant, in part, to promote a fund operated 
by State Street that selectively invested in companies with gender-diverse 
boards.69 The index fund trades under the ticker symbol SHE, and a plaque 
at the base of the statue read, “Know the power of women in leadership. SHE 
makes a difference.”70 Erected on March 7, 2017, the day before 
International Women’s Day, the statue drew immediate news coverage and 
social media attention. While initially given only a week-long permit, it 
ultimately remained in place for eighteen months, and a petition drive sought 
to make it permanent.71 Fearless Girl was a resounding success as a 
marketing campaign, but as described in more detail below, State Street 
followed this marketing coup with action. Concurrent with the placement of 
the statue, State Street announced that it would demand accountability from 
companies that lacked gender diversity on their boards.72 
 
 67. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2073 (noting that index funds have an incentive to 
emphasize their ESG stewardship in order to deflect the criticism of being excessively passive, and that 
they might take stands that appeal to investors); Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 3, at 
55 (noting funds’ public announcements related to gender diversity); see also Paul Rissman & Diana 
Kearney, Rise of the Shadow ESG Regulators: Investment Advisers, Sustainability Accounting, and Their 
Effects on Corporate Social Responsibility, 49 ENVTL. L. REP. 10155, 10172 (2019) (explaining how 
asset managers supported voluntary ESG disclosure). 
 68. Fearless Girl, MCCANN WORLDGROUP, https://www.mccannworldgroup.com/work/fearless-
girl [https://perma.cc/RDV8-V63K]. 
 69. See Bethany McLean, The Backstory Behind that 'Fearless Girl' Statue on Wall Street,  
ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/fearless-girl-wall-stre 
et/519393 [https://perma.cc/8KH7-6LPU]. 
 70. Jen Wieczner, Why the Fearless Girl Statue’s Controversial ‘SHE’ Plaque Was Removed, 
FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2017, 1:08 PM), https://fortune.com/2017/04/17/fearless-girl-statue-nyc-plaque-she-
nasdaq [https://perma.cc/ZPF5-7P4M]. 
 71. Rachael Revesz, Campaign Launches to Make ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue on Wall Street 
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fearless-girl-statue-wall-street-petition-permanent-campaign-a7621231.html [https://perma.cc/2U8Z-
D2Z5]. 
 72. See Joann S. Lublin & Sarah Krouse, State Street to Start Voting Against Companies That 
Don’t Have Women Directors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
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While the Fearless Girl campaign garnered significant news coverage, 
other index fund managers’ efforts have been more specifically directed at 
corporate managers. In 2018, index fund giant BlackRock reached out to 
more than three hundred companies in the Russell 1000 with fewer than two 
women on their boards “asking that they justify” the lack of diversity.73 
Unlike most engagement efforts, this engagement was widely publicized, 
and the tone—at least publicly—was far more confrontational than other 
types of index fund engagement: “It is absolutely not a thing that we do over 
bottles of wine. If they’re lucky, they get a really nasty cup of BlackRock 
coffee,” said BlackRock’s head of global stewardship Michelle Edkins.74 
When interviewed by Bloomberg, Edkins’s dissatisfaction with the 
responses from some firms’ management was clear: “On board diversity, 
frankly some of the answers we got were from the 1880s.”75 Edkins cited 
examples such as, “There aren’t any qualified women,” “We don’t need a 
woman director,” and “We’re not a consumer-facing company.”76 
For its part, Vanguard has also emphasized diversity in its engagement 
efforts. In a 2019 policy statement, Vanguard wrote, “[W]e have long 
believed in the importance of diversity in the boardroom, and we have 
increasingly advocated for greater representation of women on corporate 
boards.”77 As with BlackRock, Vanguard took a pro-diversity position in a 
letter to corporate directors, outlining its expectations that companies would 




 73. See Emily Chasan, BlackRock Asks Companies to Explain Dearth of Women on Boards, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2018, 11:27 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-02/blackroc 
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Meanings, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 20, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-blackrock-vanguard-
and-state-street-engagement-has-different-meanings-1516449600?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/ 
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expectation with an implied threat to vote against boards that failed to meet 
these expectations: “[Boards’] demonstration of meaningful progress over 
time will inform our engagement and voting going forward.”79  
2.  Backing Advocacy with Votes 
These calls to action, both public and through back channel engagement 
with individual companies, were not idle talk. Index fund operators have not 
been afraid to aggressively challenge boards when companies are not 
responsive to calls for gender diversity, including voting against current 
directors.  
In March 2017, State Street announced that it would vote against the 
chair of the nominating committee of boards that failed to show progress on 
gender diversity.80 Since the nominating committee is charged with 
identifying director candidates, the threat was targeted against the board 
member best positioned to address a lack of diversity. While State Street 
initially did not attach numerical requirements to this policy, it made clear 
that there is no justification for having no female directors at all.81 State 
Street backed its demands for action with the substantial power of its proxy 
ballots. In June 2017, the advisor announced that it had voted against 
directors at four hundred companies without female directors that did not 
persuade State Street that they were making adequate efforts to diversify.82  
In September 2018, State Street further escalated its diversity voting 
guidelines, stating that, beginning in 2020, it would withhold votes from the 
entire nominating committee if a company did not have at least one woman 
among its directors and had not satisfied State Street that it was making 
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 80. See Lublin & Krouse, supra note 72.  
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committee in play and also attached a numerical goal (albeit a minimal one) 
to diversity efforts.  
BlackRock followed a similar pattern in its approach to voting. After 
the public campaign, letters, and engagement efforts described above, 
BlackRock announced in February 2018 that it would vote against the entire 
nominating committee at firms that did not show progress on gender 
diversity, and said that it “would normally expect to see at least two women 
directors on every board.”84  
Notably, these funds challenged management by withholding votes 
from directors in uncontested elections. Thus, by focusing on contested 
elections and shareholder proposals, the literature missed funds’ most 
significant form of activism. Pressuring managers by withholding votes is a 
potentially more effective channel of activism in this context, particularly 
given the size (and voting power) of the funds involved. 
This sequence of events reflects an escalating, and, as we argue below, 
ultimately competitive dynamic among index funds to press firms to increase 
the representation of women on their boards.  
B.  INDEX FUND OPERATORS AS THOUGHT LEADERS 
 Index funds are not simply following the mutual fund herd in their 
diversity efforts. It is instructive to compare the position of the big three 
index fund operators on board diversity, as outlined above, to that of the 
largest proxy advisory firm, ISS, and other large mutual fund complexes 
such as Fidelity and T. Rowe Price.  
ISS, which is in the business of selling proxy-voting information and 
recommendations to asset managers, has been a pioneer in pressuring 
companies, through its proxy recommendations, to adopt a number of 
corporate governance reforms, including strong opposition to “clear day” 
poison pills, among others. But when it comes to diversity, ISS has lagged 
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behind the big three index fund complexes and continues to have a policy on 
diversity that is materially less stringent than the big three. While the big 
three emphasize that they do not blindly follow ISS guidelines, they all pay 
attention to ISS’s policies and recommendations. Further, ISS remains 
influential among other asset managers and is thought to swing a 
considerable share of the proxy vote, either directly through its 
recommendations or through the supporting reasoning and research it 
provides. ISS issues voting policy guidelines that outline circumstances 
under which it will recommend votes against directors as a result of 
perceived governance deficiencies. Because of ISS’s influence in the 
marketplace, these guidelines have a pseudo-regulatory effect.  
Along several dimensions, ISS stakes out fairly aggressive stands on 
matters of corporate governance. For example, ISS is opposed to companies 
adopting “clear-day” poison pills absent a shareholder vote and will 
recommend a vote against boards that do so.85 By contrast, the big three 
index fund managers have relatively ambiguous policies.  
However, when it comes to diversity on boards, the policies of the big 
three, outlined above, stake a position well ahead of ISS, both in terms of 
timing and in terms of what the policies ask of companies. State Street was 
the first complex to make a strong public stand in favor of diversity in March 
2017, and State Street’s statement required companies to show progress, 
explain their lack of progress, or face withheld votes. Only in November 
2017 did ISS add a diversity component to its guidelines, and its position 
was that it would “highlight” insufficiently diverse boards, but would not 
recommend withholding votes.86 A year later, in November 2018, ISS 
announced that it would include diversity as a component of its corporate 
governance quality score, but, by that point, BlackRock had already 
announced—in February 2018—that it would ordinarily expect to see two 
women on each board, and State Street was already voting against directors 
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en masse and had recently announced it would expand its withhold campaign 
to the entire nominating committee.87 
The most recent version of ISS’s voting guidelines has finally caught 
up to where BlackRock and State Street were over a year ago, but these 
changes only took effect earlier this year. ISS’s board diversity policy now 
states: 
For companies in the Russell 3000 or S&P 1500 indices, generally vote 
against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other 
directors on a case-by-case basis) at companies where there are no women 
on the company’s board.88 
ISS then lists three mitigating factors, including a “firm 
commitment . . . to appoint at least one female to the board in the near term” 
that would avoid an adverse recommendation.89 This policy closely 
corresponds to State Street’s 2017 voting behavior but took effect three years 
later. 
High profile active fund managers have also lagged on the diversity 
issue. For example, the following statement from Fidelity’s voting guidelines 
is unlikely to strike fear into the hearts of board nominating committees:  
Fidelity may support shareholder proposals that request additional 
disclosures from companies regarding environmental or social issues, 
including where it believes that the proposed disclosures could provide 
meaningful information to the investment management process without 
unduly burdening the company.90 
T. Rowe Price offers a somewhat stronger statement that nevertheless 
trails the big three index fund managers:  
We recognize diversity can be defined across a number of dimensions. 
However, if a board is to be considered meaningfully diverse, in our view 
some diversity across gender, ethnic, or nationality lines must be present. 
For companies in the U.S. and Canada, we generally oppose the re-
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elections of Governance Committee members if we can find no evidence 
of board diversity.91 
Notably, both Fidelity and T. Rowe Price primarily manage active 
funds. 
Comparing the big three’s stance on board diversity to either ISS or 
other large mutual fund complexes highlights the degree to which index 
funds are taking a leadership position on the issue of board diversity. Index 
fund managers approach board diversity differently from other issues of 
corporate governance. In the next Section, we explore whether the theoretical 
account of index fund incentives can explain why.  
C.  INDEX FUND ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
There is no doubt that index funds have acted most aggressively and 
decisively on the issue of board diversity, but the big three have also been 
vocal about other social issues, namely climate change. While the big three 
tend to frame their approach to climate change and associated regulation as 
an issue of investment risk, BlackRock in particular often discusses its 
climate change engagement as part of a larger debate over corporate 
sustainability. As early as 2015, BlackRock argued that long term investors 
needed to engage on issues of climate change. BlackRock issued a report 
highlighting the importance of climate change as an issue with significant 
impact on future portfolios.92 The report noted that climate change posed 
both physical risks—the impact of a changing climate—and regulatory 
risks—the impact of legal changes designed to mitigate climate change or 
reduce emissions. From the investors’ point of view, the report stated: 
Divesting from climate-unfriendly businesses is one option. The biggest 
polluting companies, however, have the greatest capacity for 
improvement. Engagement with corporate management teams can help 
effect positive change, especially for big institutional investors with long 
holding periods.93  
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This language suggests a role for investors in mitigating the effect of 
polluting companies on the environment.  
This theme was echoed in BlackRock CEO Larry Fink’s 2018 letter to 
CEOs, which focused on the importance of corporations articulating a 
“social purpose.”94 Fink stated that “[t]o prosper over time, every company 
must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a 
positive contribution to society,”95 ending with a call to boards to consider a 
series of questions: 
Companies must ask themselves: What role do we play in the community? 
How are we managing our impact on the environment? Are we working 
to create a diverse workforce? Are we adapting to technological change? 
Are we providing the retraining and opportunities that our employees and 
our business will need to adjust to an increasingly automated world? Are 
we using behavioral finance and other tools to prepare workers for 
retirement, so that they invest in a way that will help them achieve their 
goals? 
As we enter 2018, BlackRock is eager to participate in discussions about 
long-term value creation and work to build a better framework for serving 
all your stakeholders. Today, our clients–who are your company’s 
owners–are asking you to demonstrate the leadership and clarity that will 
drive not only their own investment returns, but also the prosperity and 
security of their fellow citizens. We look forward to engaging with you on 
these issues.96 
 More recently, BlackRock issued another report with a somewhat 
different tone. In April 2019, BlackRock published Getting Physical, which 
highlighted BlackRock’s efforts to use big data and climate modeling to 
“enhance portfolio resilience” to the increasing frequency of adverse weather 
events and other impacts of climate change.97 The discussion of engagement 
in the report focuses on companies as entities impacted by the external force 
of climate change, not as contributors to the problem and focuses on 
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engagement to ensure companies are prepared, not to advocate reduced 
emissions.  
Following the pattern of escalation we have observed in the context of 
board diversity, BlackRock has announced that it would make climate 
change a central part of its investment approach going forward.98 BlackRock 
CEO Larry Fink dedicated his 2019 annual letter to climate issues, which he 
argued would reshape the economy and asset management.99 In addition to 
calling for additional disclosure to permit investors to better manage climate-
related investment risk, BlackRock announced that it would divest the firm’s 
actively managed portfolios (about $1.8 trillion) from coal stocks.100 While 
divestment from one fossil fuel and pressure on firms to disclose risks are 
somewhat modest steps, they are nevertheless concrete, and transition of the 
world’s largest asset manager away from coal in its managed portfolios is a 
significant development.  
State Street has also foregrounded its climate change efforts, writing:  
Sustainability has been at the center of SSGA’s asset stewardship program 
for a number of years. SSGA has had approximately 2,200 engagements 
on ESG issues with over 1,200 companies in our global portfolio since 
2013. While board governance has been a significant focus of our thought 
leadership efforts in the past, we have also been engaging with companies 
and developing our views on environmental and social considerations and 
their effect on our stewardship obligations.101  
They add, “[W]e are certain that over time these issues pose both risks to and 
opportunities for long-term returns. Therefore, as stewards we are convinced 
that, as part of good business practice, ESG issues must be part of effective 
board leadership and board oversight of long-term company strategy.”102 
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For its part, Vanguard also highlights climate change and has used its 
position as a shareholder to argue for broader disclosures around the risks 
posed by climate change. Like the others, it adopts a climate-change-as-
financial-risk model in its governance policy: “We consistently engage with 
portfolio companies about climate risk, especially companies in carbon-
intensive industries. We believe that climate risk can potentially have a long-
term impact on companies in many sectors.”103 Notably, Vanguard has 
largely oriented its stewardship efforts toward encouraging companies to 
make more detailed disclosures related to the risks that climate change 
creates for business, identifying this issue as one of its engagement 
priorities.104 
There is little question that the index managers’ rhetoric around board 
diversity is backed by meaningful action and a confrontational approach to 
unresponsive firms. Their approach to climate change, so far, has been less 
confrontational, perhaps reflecting the centrality of environmental issues to 
corporate operations at many companies. While these steps are tentative, it 
is clear that the big three are eager to highlight them for investors, and it is 
equally clear that index funds’ engagement on these issues has led corporate 
boards to more frequently and publicly discuss the issue of climate change.  
D.  THE PUZZLE OF INDEX FUND SOCIAL ACTIVISM 
Can the existing account of index fund activism account for index 
funds’ approach to board diversity? As argued above, the general consensus 
of the literature is that index funds can be expected to focus on market-wide 
interventions with significant upside and a low propensity to upset 
management. We argue that index fund social activism does not fit this 
profile.  
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1.  Activism Is High Impact 
We can easily dispense with the notion that index fund activism for 
diversity is merely window-dressing or marketing puffery. Companies 
frequently build marketing campaigns around salient social issues without 
accompanying action, so it is natural to be skeptical of high-profile 
campaigns. However, the evidence above establishes that index funds have 
taken concrete, effective action to back up their public comments on 
diversity, devoting their very limited shareholder engagement resources to 
diversity and voting proxies to punish recalcitrant boards. These are concrete 
interventions with real costs and consequences.  
These activist actions have been effective—it is clear that companies 
feel real pressure to respond to calls for board diversity. On September 27, 
2018, State Street reported that since its announced intention to vote against 
all-male boards in March 2017, more than three hundred companies had 
added female directors to their boards.105 In its recent annual report for 2018, 
State Street reported that the number of companies that had added female 
directors to their boards increased to more than four hundred companies and 
more firms had pledged to follow suit.106 According to Equilar, the 
percentage of newly elected directors who are women has increased 75 
percent in three years, from 20.1 percent in 2015 to 35.6 percent in the third 
quarter of 2018.107 The last S&P 500 company with an all-male board 
recently appointed a woman as a director.108  
2.  Board Diversity and Value Creation 
Is intervention on board diversity the sort of market-wide, high-impact, 
value-creating change we might expect index funds to undertake? It is 
certainly true that index funds have framed their diversity efforts in terms of 
long-term value creation. However, recall that index funds have only weak 
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incentives to pursue value-enhancing interventions in the first place. For 
value-creation to be a plausible motive for index fund action on board 
diversity, such intervention would need to be particularly profitable. As it is, 
two aspects of board diversity activism are inconsistent with the purported 
value-creation motive.  
First, though index fund operators appeal to the academic literature in 
making the case for increased diversity, the academic record is more 
ambiguous than these arguments would suggest. An extensive literature has 
examined the effect of board gender diversity on firm value. The results of 
this literature are mixed,109 but this is likely because a fundamental difficulty 
plagues this research area, the issue of correlation versus causation. As one 
study put it: “[I]n equilibrium it is difficult to distinguish if knowledgeable 
board members increase firm value through their actions or if highly valued 
firms simply attract knowledgeable board members.”110 For example, a 2009 
study found that differences in board monitoring intensity were correlated 
with the gender of board members, suggesting that boards with more women 
tended to be more conscientious monitors, and found that, in a simple 
regression, companies with more women directors performed better.111 
However, the researchers noted that the “correlation disappears once we 
apply reasonable procedures to tackle omitted variables and reverse causality 
problems” and found that, in a richer empirical design, “firms perform worse 
the greater is the gender diversity of the board.”112 Other studies have found 
a positive link between diversity and firm value,113 and still others have 
found no link.114 The literature is, to be sure, still in flux, but it cannot be 
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Ross, Does Female Representation in Top Management Improve Firm Performance? A Panel Data 
Investigation, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1072, 1079–82 (2012). 
 114. See, e.g., Larelle Chapple & Jacquelyn E. Humphrey, Does Board Gender Diversity Have a 
Financial Impact? Evidence Using Stock Portfolio Performance, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 709, 721 (2014); 
Corinne Post & Kris Byron, Women on Boards and Firm Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 58 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1546 (2014). 
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said that current empirical evidence unambiguously supports the claim that 
board diversification is a particularly effective way for shareholders to 
generate returns. 
To illustrate, some studies address this endogeneity problem by 
studying reforms that have required companies to diversify boards. In 2003, 
Norway required, by law, that 40 percent of directors be women at a time 
when only 9 percent of directors were female.115 In examining the effects of 
this law, one study concluded that the adoption of the law had a large, 
negative effect on firm value both at the time of adoption and in measured 
performance after the change took effect.116 By contrast, another study found 
no effect on firm value when studying the same change.117 Yet another 2013 
study found higher labor costs and lower short-term profits among firms 
affected by the change.118 Even if these papers told an entirely consistent 
story, the dramatic nature of the Norway intervention (with a 40 percent 
representation requirement imposed on a short timeline, punishable by 
dissolution) and the absence of a clear control group for the Norway change 
would raise questions about what it could teach us about other contexts. 
More recently, California adopted a law requiring companies headquartered 
there to comply with a mandatory gender quota.119 An initial study of the 
market response to this rule suggests that firms that would be affected by the 
change showed significant decreases in firm value when the change was 
announced.120 However, the authors of this study call into question the 
interpretation that the diversity quota was directly responsible for the decline 
in value, suggesting instead that the reform demonstrated political 
willingness to impose potentially costly regulatory requirements on 
California firms and arguing that the resulting fall in value reflected 
 
 115. See Kristine Nergaard, Government Proposes Gender Quotas on Company Boards, 
EUROFOUND (June 24, 2003), https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2003/government-pr 
oposes-gender-quotas-on-company-boards [https://perma.cc/7KWB-EX6P]. 
 116. Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 109. 
 117. B. Espen Eckbo, Knut Nygaard & Karin S. Thorburn, Board Gender-Balancing and Firm 
Value 29–30 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 463/2016, 2018), https://pa 
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746786 [https://perma.cc/5K3S-TD9D]. 
 118. David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from 
Quotas, 5 AM. ECON. J. 136, 147  (2013). 
 119. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified at CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3). 
 120. Felix von Meyernick, Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, As California Goes, So Goes the Nation? The Impact of Board Gender Quotas on Firm 
Performance and the Legislation of Non-Economic Values 2–3 (June 19, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3303798 [https://perma.cc/2CEN-H4J5] (unpublished article). 
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investors’ fears of what might come next rather than any real impact of the 
quota on firm performance.121 
Second, even if diversifying boards represented low-hanging fruit for 
value creation, this would still not explain why index funds are being more 
proactive on this front than other money managers. Index funds’ incentives 
to engage in value-creating activism are weaker than those for actively 
managed funds or hedge funds. As such, we would expect these other 
investors to lead the charge as they do with more conventional corporate 
governance interventions. Instead, hedge funds are lagging behind a group 
of investors with only weak incentives to worry about firm value. This is 
inconsistent with a shareholder value creation account of board 
diversification.122  
In arguing that conventional shareholder value creation is unlikely to 
explain index funds’ commitment to promoting diversity, we do not mean to 
disparage these efforts. In the wake of the Me Too movement, there are 
sound reasons for companies to seek diverse leadership. And, even if the 
economic evidence is ambiguous, there are legitimate concerns of social 
justice and equity in play. A well-run company in 2020 ought to have a 
diverse board, full stop. But the entire thrust of the index fund corporate 
governance literature is that index funds have very weak incentives to invest 
in ensuring that the companies whose equities they hold are well run. As 
such, index funds’ activism on this issue is conspicuous, and the empirical 
literature does not explain it.  
3.  Activism is Not Risk-Free 
Index funds’ intervention on socially salient issues is not risk-free to 
index fund complexes. It is fair to say that board diversity is not an issue that 
 
 121. Id. at 3–5. 
 122. A rejoinder might be that board diversification is a long-term play that is uniquely attractive to 
index investors with permanent stakes in large companies. Perhaps hedge fund managers and active fund 
managers, with their eye on beating the market in the short term are simply less worried about issues of 
board structure that will play out over the long term. However, this argument impounds a questionable 
claim: though board diversity is an eminently observable feature of a firm, somehow the market fails to 
anticipate this future value and impound it in the current price. This type of “short-termism” argument is 
a familiar one and is frequently made by corporate managers against hedge funds launching activist 
campaigns against struggling companies. While it is difficult to conclusively rebut an argument that turns 
on an ad hoc invocation of market inefficiency, we see no reason why investors collectively would fail to 
appropriately price board diversity. As such, the argument that index funds are uniquely suited to pursue 
this value-creation strategy should be regarded as suspect.  
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is likely to draw public backlash from a CEO, though proxy votes cast 
against directors always carry the possibility of acrimony. But CEOs are not 
the only actors in play. Any financial institution that compares in size to the 
big three index fund managers is likely to be concerned about regulation. 
The influence of index funds over public companies has not escaped the 
notice of policy makers. Perhaps, by engaging so publicly and aggressively 
on a salient issue, index funds hope to signal their commitment to be good 
stewards of their investments and therefore good citizens of the corporate 
landscape. One reasonable account is that these campaigns are designed to 
forestall regulation.  
While plausible, it is notable that, if the motivation of index funds to 
engage in activism on diversity and other social issues is to avoid regulation, 
then it has not been entirely successful. Asset managers have attracted the 
attention of the Trump administration, which has responded with guidance 
designed to brush back campaigns oriented toward social issues. On April 
23, 2018, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued a Field Assistance 
Bulletin that “reiterated” that “plan fiduciaries are not permitted to sacrifice 
investment return or take on additional investment risk as a means of using 
plan investments to promote collateral social policy goals.”123 On April 10, 
2019, the Trump administration issued an executive order on energy 
infrastructure, which included a directive to DOL to “complete a review of 
existing Department of Labor guidance on the fiduciary responsibilities for 
proxy voting to determine whether any such guidance should be rescinded, 
replaced, or modified to ensure consistency with current law and policies that 
promote long-term growth and maximize return on ERISA plan assets.”124 
That executive order was framed as an effort to aid the energy industry by 
questioning whether filing and voting in support of environmental 
shareholder proposals was consistent with the fund trustees’ fiduciary duties 
to their participants and beneficiaries.125 The executive order was a strong 
signal from the White House that it disapproved of this fund-driven activism 
and viewed such activism as, at best, a distraction and, at worst, a direct 
undermining of the American energy sector. Further, while it did not 
 
 123. Memorandum from John J. Canary, Dir. of Regulations and Interpretations, U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, to Mabel Capolongo, Dir. of Enforcement—Reg’l Dirs., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Field Assistance 
Bulletin No. 2018-01 (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guid 
ance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01 [https://perma.cc/M6L5-28A6]. 
 124. Exec. Order No. 13868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15495, 15497 (Apr. 10, 2019). 
 125. Id. 
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specifically address voting on gender diversity issues, the arguments raised 
suggest disapproval of these voting policies too.  
While these directives were likely targeted primarily at pension funds, 
they are far from irrelevant to the big three. ERISA covers 401(k) plans, and 
the index funds operated by the big three hold vast sums of 401(k) 
investments. Given that employers face potential liability for the funds they 
include in their 401(k) menu, the DOL guidance, in particular, made it risky 
for employers to offer specialized mutual funds with an ESG focus.126 While 
the DOL guidance poses relatively little risk to the big three, at least as 
currently formulated, the Trump administration pushback creates a spectrum 
of regulatory uncertainty around index funds’ social activism and is evidence 
against the view that these governance interventions are explained as a 
means of staving off regulatory intervention for index funds.  
It is difficult to imagine how the administration could have provided 
better cover to funds wanting to retreat from their activism than this 
executive order. It would have been perfectly plausible for the big three to 
suggest, with regret or otherwise, that White House hostility meant that they 
had to tread carefully in this arena. It could have easily led the funds to 
reemphasize their core mission of pursuing returns and point out that they 
had done what they could but that this activism had put a significant target 
on their backs as well as note that the proper forum for pursuing 
environmental change was the political process. The funds may have even 
announced new efforts to engage or lobby inside the traditional political 
apparatus on these issues while separating these efforts from their 
shareholder voting policies. Alternatively, the funds could have gone on 
saying all the right things while actually stepping back from their 
confrontational voting stances on this issue.  
When combined with the existing managerial pressure, the executive 
order could have provided all the necessary incentive to retreat. The evidence 
suggests, however, that the funds ignored this executive order and continued 
on their more aggressive course. BlackRock’s more aggressive voting policy 
postdates it.127 And if one examines not just how these funds voted in the 
 
 126. See Nick Thornton, ESG Investing in 401(k)s Faces Fiduciary, Regulatory Questions, 
BENEFITS PRO (Mar. 19, 2019, 4:14 PM), https://www.benefitspro.com/2019/03/19/esg-investing-in-
401ks-faces-fiduciary-regulatory-questions [https://perma.cc/6MYF-LTSB]. 
 127. See BLACKROCK INV. STEWARDSHIP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PROXY VOTING 
GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES 6 (Jan. 2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-
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2019 proxy season, but also how they have publicly trumpeted those votes, 
it appears that they intend to resist the signal in that executive order, not yield 
to it.128 This is not the behavior of funds determined to avoid confrontation. 
In addition, to deflect some of the managerial and political pressure that 
they face, the funds could commit to following ISS recommendations in 
word and deed. ISS, the shareholder-friendly proxy advisory firm, has long 
taken positions on environmental and gender diversity issues, sometimes in 
favor of such proposals.129 One could therefore imagine the funds publicly 
committing to follow ISS’s recommendations on these proposals, perhaps 
even announcing their intent to push ISS to take particular stances. This 
could have relieved the funds of pressure to act on environmental and 
diversity issues while retaining a buffer between themselves and the 
managerial or political pressure. However, the funds’ behavior shows that 
they do not want the buffer; they want the credit for taking direct action. Far 
from marching in lockstep with ISS recommendations and deferring to its 
judgment, these funds have gotten out ahead of ISS on these issues.130  
*** 
On balance, the evidence suggests that index funds’ activism around 
social issues is inconsistent with the incentive structure that has been posited 
in the existing literature. Index fund social activism simply stands apart from 
 
sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF5C-5XYF] (“To the extent that 
we believe that a company has not adequately accounted for diversity in its board composition within a 
reasonable timeframe, we may vote against the nominating/governance committee for an apparent lack 
of commitment to board effectiveness.”). 
 128. See, e.g., John Manganaro, ESG, Proxy Voting Trends Unlikely to Shift on Executive Order, 
PLANSPONSOR (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.plansponsor.com/esg-proxy-voting-trends-unlikely-shift-
executive-order [https://perma.cc/FE73-G8ZM ] (“[T]he impact of the executive order is likely to be more 
symbolic than substantive when it comes to the real-world activities of retirement plan fiduciaries and 
investment managers. ‘Less than one year ago . . . the DOL clarified its views on how shareholder 
engagement could be conducted in a manner consist [sic] with ERISA’s fiduciary duties,’ . . . ‘Proxy 
voting and other forms of engagement are fiduciary functions under ERISA.’ ”). 
 129. See, e.g., Environmental, Social, and Governance QualityScores to be Reflected in ISS Proxy 
Research Reports, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.issgovernance.com/iss-
announces-launch-of-environmental-social-qualityscore-corporate-profiling-solution [https://perma.cc/ 
WWE2-2SDM]. 
 130. See COMPENSIA, ISS 2019 POLICY UPDATES MAY AFFECT BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND 
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE METHODOLOGY 2 (2018), https://compensia.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ 
Thoughtful-Pay-Alert-ISS-Previews-2019-Policy-Updates-10-22-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT2M-GN8 
Y] (noting that the ISS gender diversity policy would “simply mirror” the “broader trend” among 
institutional investors like BlackRock and State Street).  
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other corporate governance interventions in both the approach the funds take 
and the impact of these efforts on corporate practice. In the balance of this 
paper, we outline an extension of the conventional framework that accounts 
for many of the facts above. We explain why issues of social importance 
have burst onto the asset management scene, why index funds’ approach to 
these issues is different than other corporate governance interventions, and 
why index funds are uniquely situated to respond to the incentives we 
identify.  
III.  THE COMING GENERATIONAL SHIFT 
While index funds’ overall passivity with respect to traditional 
corporate governance issues is consistent with the conventional wisdom that 
managerial and political pressures keep them from exercising much 
shareholder voice, index funds are actually significantly active on several 
socially responsible investment issues, namely board diversity and the 
environment. In contrast to the conventional view that funds avoid 
challenging management because they fear loss of access to companies’ 
401(k) platforms, funds are in fact quite confrontational toward management 
on these issues. There is hardly a more aggressive stance one can take toward 
a corporate board than voting against its members, yet the evidence shows 
that these funds have repeatedly taken such aggressive action. They persist 
in that activism even in the face of intense managerial and political pressure 
and trumpet that activism. They avoid obvious opportunities to retreat from 
it as well as alternative approaches that would enable them to claim to be 
doing what is right while following someone else’s lead. This strongly 
suggests that there is another, countervailing force that is driving this 
behavior that has been overlooked in the academic literature. 
Moreover, social activism is trending decisively toward increased 
confrontation with boards and management. In the early phase of this new 
social activism, funds merely voted against the chairs of nomination 
committees for failing to include women on boards.131 These policies have 
been revised in favor of more aggressive approaches ranging from voting 
against the entire nomination committees to even voting against the entire 
board.132 This behavior is not characteristic of funds that are acting in fear of 
 
 131. See, e.g., Lublin & Krouse, supra note 72. 
 132. See, e.g., Whyte, supra note 83. 
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managerial retaliation or rendered reticent by weak incentives. Further, funds 
persist in this behavior not only in the face of concerns about managerial 
retaliation, but in the face of political pressure. Consider the funds’ response 
to the Trump White House’s recent executive order directing DOL to revisit 
trustee fiduciary duties under ERISA.133  
To be sure, index funds do fear retaliation, but they fear something else 
more. That force is the rise in economic importance of the millennials, a 
generation with a pronounced and novel preference for social responsibility 
in corporate governance. Index funds—unable to distinguish themselves 
with superior returns—are sensitive to these investor preferences as a threat 
to their asset base and as a means to create investor affinity in an otherwise 
commoditized industry. As the giant index funds rush to demonstrate their 
bona fides in this new reality, we are witnessing the rise of a new, millennial-
driven corporate governance, one that is values-driven, not value-driven. 
Current fund and market behavior, notably the behavior just described, 
cannot be fully explained without understanding this development. It is 
already transforming the investment arena and we believe it will have 
implications for decades. 
A.  THE RISE OF THE MILLENNIALS AS SAVERS 
The business community is facing a generational shift, from baby 
boomers to millennials. Over the next decade, millennials will assume a 
rising role among investors, employees, and consumers, and they will 
become the most dominant generation not long thereafter, outstripping their 
Generation X parents.134 As a result of that current and future prominence, a 
large body of research has developed to study this generation, the largest 
since the baby boomers. That research has taken almost every imaginable 
form, assessing this generation’s political, consumer, cultural, employment, 
and investment preferences. These studies are ongoing but certain distinct 
features are already well documented. 
 
 133. Exec. Order No. 13868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15495 (Apr. 10, 2019). 
 134. See Richard Fry, Millennials Overtake Baby Boomers as America’s Largest Generation, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/01/Millennials-overtake-
baby-boomers [https://perma.cc/49ZD-R4UE] (“[T]he Millennial population is projected to peak in 2033, 
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Most relevant for our purposes, millennials are less focused on their 
investment returns than any generation since such questions were first asked. 
The evidence suggests not that they are indifferent to investment returns, but 
that they have a greater tendency to assess and even prioritize the social and 
other real world effects of their investments.135 Prior generations viewed 
larger social questions as belonging to the political sphere: the sphere of 
political campaigns, legislation, and perhaps litigation. The investment 
sphere was the place to make money and save for retirement. But millennial 
views and attitudes toward investment suggest a collapsing, or at least 
eroding, distinction between what were once thought of as distinct spheres 
of activity. 
This broader, more socially conscious attitude toward investment is 
creating bottom-up pressure for investment funds to demonstrate how they 
advance socially important goals. That bottom-up pressure has now reached 
the upper-echelons of the market and is reshaping how these massively 
powerful institutional investors engage in activism. The reason why this 
bottom-up pressure has reached the upper echelons of the market is 
straightforward. The millennial generation will wield massive wealth and the 
race to manage that wealth has already begun.  
The massive prize of managing millennial wealth has triggered a new 
high-stakes race among funds and has created strong competitive pressures 
to offer investment products that have high social value. Millennials are just 
now getting introduced to “brands” like BlackRock, Vanguard, and State 
Street. State Street has chosen to introduce itself to a new generation with 
the Fearless Girl—as late as 2019 a Google search for “Fearless Girl” yielded 
a State Street link titled, “About Us—Who We Are—Fearless Girl—State 
Street Global Advisors.” Instead of “Retire in style,” “Trust us with your nest 
egg,” “We’re so smart we’ll make you a lot of money,” the message was: 
“We are Fearless Girl.” When millennials think of State Street, they now 
think of the Fearless Girl, wearing a pink hat knitted by admirers who pose 
for Instagram selfies with her, standing up to the Wall Street bull. In addition, 
as we write this, the State Street home page features a picture of Michael 
Bloomberg with State Street CEO Ron O’Hanley captioned, “Tackling 
Climate Change Risk: Ron O’Hanley and Mike Bloomberg discuss how 
 
 135. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 1 (“In a recent survey by Deloitte, millennial workers were asked 
what the primary purpose of businesses should be–63 percent more of them said ‘improving society’ than 
said ‘generating profit.’ ”). 
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grassroots efforts like Beyond Carbon and institutional capital can promote 
a cleaner and more sustainable world.”136 This directly marries millennials’ 
concern about gender diversity and the environment to the investment 
products State Street offers.  
Our thesis is that management of millennial wealth is driving the funds’ 
environmental and diversity activism. The prize is so large that winning it is 
the countervailing force that pushes funds to overcome managerial and 
political pressure to remain passive. For our thesis to be correct, two things 
must also be true: (1) millennial wealth will be massive such that the time to 
compete for it is now and (2) the way to reach that millennial wealth is to 
target this generation’s political preferences. In the next Sections, we address 
both propositions. 
B.  MILLENNIALS’ WEALTH AND “THE GREAT TRANSFER” 
 In the coming decades, somewhere between $12 trillion and $30 trillion 
will be transferred to millennials.137 Even the low end of that spectrum will 
mark the largest intergenerational wealth shift in history.138 It is comparable 
to the gross domestic product of the United States139 and far exceeds the 
current assets under management by any given U.S. mutual fund complex.140 
And it is no secret. Investment professionals are aware of it. It has been 
 
 136. Tackling Climate Change Risk: A Conversation with Ron O’Hanley and Mike Bloomberg, 
STATE STREET (July 2019), http://www.statestreet.com/ideas/articles/ohanley-bloomberg-climate-chang 
e.html [https://perma.cc/Q37M-JDY4]. 
 137. See Tett, supra note 15 (citing U.S. Trust estimate that $12 trillion in assets will pass to 
millennials over the next decade, and Deloitte estimate that $24 trillion will be transferred over the next 
fifteen years); Fink, supra note 1 (“In the years to come, the sentiments of these generations will drive 
not only their decisions as employees but also as investors, with the world undergoing the largest transfer 
of wealth in history: $24 trillion from baby boomers to millennials.”); Skinner, supra note 15 (“Over the 
next 30 years, an epic $30 trillion will be passed down from baby boomers to Generation X to 
Millennials.”). 
 138. Tett, supra note 15 (“This is striking by any measure, representing the largest wealth transfer 
in history, equivalent to three-quarters of US GDP.”).  
 139. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, News Release, Gross Domestic Product, Second Quarter 2019 
(Advance Estimate) and Annual Update (July 26, 2019), https://www.bea.gov/news/2019/gross-domestic 
-product-2nd-quarter-2019-advance-estimate-and-annual-update [https://perma.cc/T2ZZ-9Q5S] 
(“Current-dollar GDP increased . . . to a level of $21.34 trillion.”). 
 140. See 10 Largest Mutual Fund Companies by Assets, INV. NEWS, https://www.investmentnew 
s.com/gallery/20180824/FREE/824009999/PH/10-largest-mutual-fund-companies-by-assets [https://per 
ma.cc/B9GS-CQGY] (“The mutual fund industry currently has $17.7 trillion in assets, $10.1 trillion of 
which is held by 10 companies.”). 
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reported in the press and industry-generated studies. Paul Donovan, chief 
global economist of UBS’s Wealth Management unit, put it best: 
It’s worth pointing out that the millennial generation, which we’re all 
wringing our hands about—these poor people not able to own houses!—
this is going to be the wealthiest generation ever that we’ve 
experienced . . . . The basic fact is that wealth does not disappear in a puff 
of smoke . . . . The wealth is still there in the economy. 
When I die my nieces will inherit the assets that I have accumulated. And 
indeed the assets my parents have accumulated . . . There are fewer 
millennials than baby boomers. The concentration of wealth will increase, 
and fewer people will share the national wealth.141 
According to one estimate, this intergenerational transfer will peak from 
2031–2045, when roughly 10 percent of all U.S. wealth will change hands 
every five years.142  
True, baby boomers will retain the largest percentage of disposable 
capital for some years to come,143 but the capital shift to Generation X and 
 
 141. Jim Edwards, Millennials Will Be the Richest Generation Ever, According to UBS—So 
Perhaps They Ought to Stop Complaining About the Housing Market, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 25, 2018, 2:08 
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/interview-with-ubs-paul-donovan-on-millennials-and-inequality 
-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/3T2R-T2FU].  
 142. See ACCENTURE, THE “GREATER” WEALTH TRANSFER: CAPITALIZING ON THE 
INTERGENERATIONAL SHIFT IN WEALTH (2015), https://www.accenture.com/nl-en/~/media/Accenture/ 
Conversion-Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Industries_5/Accenture-CM-AWAMS-Wealth-
Transfer-Final-June2012-Web-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VJN-K7A4] (“While the ‘Great Transfer’ 
will see over $12 trillion shift, the ‘Greater’ wealth transfer is much larger, estimated at over $30 trillion 
in financial and nonfinancial assets in North America. At its peak between 2031 and 2045, 10 percent of 
total wealth in the United States will be changing hands every five years. The accelerating pace of this 
transfer, combined with the generational differences in the demands and expectations of wealth 
management service providers, makes this massive transfer of wealth between generations a defining 
issue for the wealth management industry.”). 
 143. See Meredith Jones, Millennials Have More Money Than You Think—So Expect ESG Funds 
in Your 401(k), MARKETWATCH (Oct. 24, 2018, 2:39 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/Mille 
nnials-have-more-money-than-you-think-so-expect-esg-funds-in-your-401k-2018-10-23 [https://perma. 
cc/33GL-9LAG] (“To be clear, baby boomers still contain the largest segment of millionaires AND 
control 70% of disposable capital, but they are aging and will transfer up to another $30 trillion (with a 
‘T’) to their Gen X and millennial children and grandchildren over the next decade and a half-ish. Based 
on these figures, it would seem that millennials can (or will) be able to put their money where their mouths 
are when it comes to responsible investments, and why there are a host of investing options no matter 
where millennials fall on the income spectrum. In addition, now that millennials are the dominant force 
in the workplace, there will likely be more adoption of responsible investment options within 401(k) 
plans, making it even easier for millennials investors to align their values with their investments. Although 
less than 10% of 401(k)s currently offer ESG options, large financial firms (think BlackRock, Wells 
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the millennials has already begun, and it will only accelerate over time.144 
While the actual size of that wealth transfer is debatable, the economic 
significance of managing it is not. In BlackRock CEO Larry Fink’s now 
famous 2019 shareholder letter, he described the forthcoming asset transfer 
from baby boomers to millennials—which he estimated at $24 trillion—as 
“the largest transfer of wealth in history.”145  
Even if one were to assume that the bulk of disposable wealth will 
remain in the hands of baby boomers for some time, it does not follow that 
investment fund activism will prioritize that generation’s preferences. 
Barring some catastrophe, we think it is exceedingly unlikely that baby 
boomers, who have begun to retire, are still “in play” from a marketing 
perspective. That generation already has established investment advisors 
who have already made the bulk of their profits off of managing that money. 
Further, baby boomers are also entering the most risk-averse stage of life. 
The real competition is for future revenues and new market entrants, and that 
is why the current absolute size of a generation’s wealth should not be the 
only factor. One can readily imagine that a retiree who has already worked 
with State Street for decades may not have heard of Fearless Girl or State 
Street’s diversity voting policies, and if he did and somehow objected to 
either, it seems unlikely that he would switch to BlackRock over it, where 
he would find an institution pursuing largely the same objectives anyway.  
BlackRock itself has observed this basic marketing point in its report, 
“Understanding Millennial Investors.” In a section titled, ‘Affiliation: Brand 
loyalty is earned,’ the report states: “[M]illennials are still forming loyalties, 
and are therefore more likely to switch or supplement their provider for the 
right incentive . . . . Both [G]en X and Millennials agree on common 
characteristics that give a brand strength . . . but it is the latter group that not 
only expect but are demanding to see companies doing things the ‘right’ 
way—especially in financial services.”146  
 
Fargo and Natixis to name a few) are betting that will change and are developing products for the 401(k) 
marketplace.”). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Fink, supra note 1 (“In the years to come, the sentiments of these generations will drive not 
only their decisions as employees but also as investors, with the world undergoing the largest transfer of 
wealth in history: $24 trillion from baby boomers to millennials.”). 
 146. Understanding Millennial Investors: A Generation Game: Gen X and Millennials, 
BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/uk/intermediaries/insights/millienial-investors [https://perma. 
cc/P3XU-XBPL]. 
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The list of financial institutions and major media outlets that have 
studied and reported on the issue of future millennial wealth, having all 
reached more or less the same conclusion, is extensive. It includes many of 
the leading financial institutions and journals of our day, including Deloitte, 
BlackRock, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo, The 
Harvard Business Review, The Financial Times, The Economist, CNN, 
Pensions and Investments, and so forth.147 
 
 147. See Fink, supra note 1 (“Companies that fulfill their purpose and responsibilities to 
stakeholders reap rewards over the long-term. Companies that ignore them stumble and fail. This dynamic 
is becoming increasingly apparent as the public holds companies to more exacting standards. And it will 
continue to accelerate as millennials–who today represent 35 percent of the workforce–express new 
expectations of the companies they work for, buy from, and invest in. Attracting and retaining the best 
talent increasingly requires a clear expression of purpose. With unemployment improving across the 
globe, workers, not just shareholders, can and will have a greater say in defining a company’s purpose, 
priorities, and even the specifics of its business. Over the past year, we have seen some of the world’s 
most skilled employees stage walkouts and participate in contentious town halls, expressing their 
perspective on the importance of corporate purpose. This phenomenon will only grow as millennials and 
even younger generations occupy increasingly senior positions in business.”); Tett, supra note 15 (“That 
raises a crucial question: will the recipients of this wealth have different attitudes towards how they use 
it? If so, what will this mean for the world of impact investing?”); Julia Horowitz, BlackRock Is Getting 
Ready for Millennial Investors, CNN (Dec. 4, 2018, 6:00 PM) https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/04/invest 
ing/blackrock-Millennial-push/index.html [https://perma.cc/TZE8-65D2]; MSCI, SWIPE RIGHT TO 
INVEST: MILLENNIALS AND ESG, THE PERFECT MATCH? 2 (Nov. 2017) https://www.msci.com/document 
s/10199/07e7a7d3-59c3-4d0b-b0b5-029e8fd3974b [https://perma.cc/YF8M-FXT9] (“‘The No. 1 
question I get from advisers is how to handle the coming generational wealth transfer,’ said ETF.com’s 
Mr. Nadig, ‘some $30 trillion that will make its way from the baby boomers to millennials in the coming 
two decades. ESG has emerged as one of the dominant answers to that question.’ ”); Millennials Drive 
Growth in Sustainable Investing, MORGAN STANLEY (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.morganstanley.com/ 
ideas/sustainable-socially-responsible-investing-Millennials-drive-growth [https://perma.cc/7AET-BX7 
R]; Mark R. Kramer, The Backlash to Larry Fink’s Letter Shows How Far Business Has to Go on Social 
Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-backlash-to-larry-finks-
letter-shows-how-far-business-has-to-go-on-social-responsibility [https://perma.cc/J6AW-4646] 
(quoting Charles Elson as saying, “This is fundamentally not the role of a public company, and it’s unfair 
to investors who may not agree with his politics. A CEO shouldn’t use house money to further a goal that 
may not create economic returns.”); VAL SRINIVAS & URVAL GORADIA, DELOITTE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS., 
THE FUTURE OF WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES: MAPPING TRENDS IN GENERATIONAL WEALTH 3 
(2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/us-generational-wealth-trends/DUP_ 
1371_Future-wealth-in-America_MASTER.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H99-KK9V] (“Millennials, already 
seen as a segment with quirky tendencies and limitless potential, will affirm their status as the new drivers 
of consumption going forward. Their financial commitments (for example, education, homes, and cars) 
will fuel growth in the banking sector. Once they graduate to higher incomes, their share of assets will 
also pick up, although their lower per-capita wealth will demand differentiated service levels. However, 
their most pronounced impact on financial services may be driven by their value-conscious behavior and 
how they buy products and services, which may force a revamp of long-entrenched operating models.”); 
Jones, supra note 143 (“Meanwhile, surveys of investors almost universally point to millennials as the 
biggest fans of responsible or sustainable investors. Morgan Stanley surveyed 1,000 active investors in 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516
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It is possible that they are all wrong. Some dissenters have argued that 
millennials’ future wealth has been overstated, in part because current trends 
suggest that baby boomers will live longer than prior generations and are 
much more likely to spend their resources on themselves than pass it on as 
inheritance.148 A recent report by the Federal Reserve concludes that 
millennials have fewer resources than either Generation X or baby boomers 
had at the same age149 and student debt loads and the Great Recession further 
 
2015 and 2017 and found that millennials were not only more interested in responsible investing (86% 
vs. 75% of the total population in 2017), but that their interest was growing. Between 2015 and 2017, the 
percentage of millennials who were ‘strongly interested’ in sustainable investing jumped a massive 10 
percentage points. A more recent survey from Crossmark Global Investments showed an even starker 
contrast between millennials and their older investing peers. While a mere 6% of seniors were even 
familiar with ESG investing, a whopping 80% of those aged 23 to 39 were aware of the strategy and 26% 
had already made ESG investments.”); Sustainable Investing Joins the Mainstream, ECONOMIST (Nov. 
25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/11/25/sustainable-investment-join 
s-the-mainstream [https://perma.cc/AL73-6UJD] (“In 2008, when she was in her mid-20s and sitting on 
a $500m inheritance, Liesel Pritzker Simmons asked her bankers about ‘impact investing.’ They fobbed 
her off. ‘They didn’t understand what I meant and offered to screen out tobacco,’ recalls the Hyatt Hotels 
descendant, philanthropist and former child film star. So she fired her bankers and advisers and set up her 
own family office, Blue Haven Initiative. It seeks investments that both offer market-rate returns and 
have a positive impact on society and the environment. ‘Financially it’s sensible risk mitigation,’ she 
says. ‘Our philanthropy becomes far more efficient if we don’t need to undo damage done in our 
investment management.’ Such ideas are gaining ground, particularly among the young. Fans of ‘socially 
responsible investment’ (SRI) hope that millennials, the generation born in the 1980s and 1990s, will drag 
these concepts into the investment mainstream. SRI is a broad-brush term, that can be used to cover 
everything from divestment from companies seen as doing harm, to limiting investment to companies 
that do measurable good (impact investing). The U.S. Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, 
a lobby group, estimates that more than a fifth ($8.7trn) of the funds under professional management in 
America is screened on SRI criteria, broadly defined, up from a ninth in 2012.”); Julien Courbe, 
Managing Millennial Money, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/fina 
ncial-services/library/managing-Millennial-money.html [https://perma.cc/F6R6-H84Q] (“Millennials’ 
lifestyle priorities will challenge traditional advisor models. This group’s savings objectives are far 
different from those of other demographics and appear eager to pursue goals that are less focused on 
wealth accumulation. Plus, major life choices such as marriage, children, and college funding are being 
pushed to later in life, so it may be some time before millennials prioritize savings. These preferences 
will defer the need for traditional financial advice. . . . [B]ut it is critical to engage the millennial group 
and make inroads as early as possible. To do so, incumbents will have to understand these preferences 
and, in response, create a more human and credible marketplace position by using the tools this 
demographic prefers.”). 
 148. See Gabriel Garcia, That $30 Trillion ‘Great Wealth Transfer’ Is a Myth, CNBC (May 22, 
2018, 8:49 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/22/that-30-trillion-great-wealth-transfer-is-a-myth.htm 
l [https://perma.cc/MK4J-UJBB]. 
 149. See Christopher Kurz, Geng Li & Daniel J. Vine, Are Millennials Different? 3 (Fed. Reserve 
Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series 2018-080, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/ 
files/2018080pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP5G-TMKF]; Hillary Hoffower, Millennials Have Been Called 
the ‘Brokest’ and the ‘Richest’ Generation, and Experts Say Both of Those Are True, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516
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hurt millennials.150 On the other hand, the Pew Research Center concluded 
that household incomes are up, even though the Fed found that individual 
incomes may be down, because more millennial women are working than in 
preceding generations.151 What seems beyond peradventure, though, is that 
the fund complexes themselves are taking millennial wealth seriously. They 
are the future of investing, and competition for their assets—and future 
assets—has already begun in earnest.  
C.  MILLENNIALS’ PREFERENCES—VALUES RATHER THAN RETURNS 
We have just established that millennials will wield massive economic 
power in the coming decades. In this Section, we review the evidence 
suggesting that millennials differ sharply from prior generations in their 
attitudes toward socially responsible investment. 
Survey results, from the Third Annual Responsible Investor Survey 
conducted by Nuveen, are consistent with a large body of research showing 
that millennials weigh the environmental impact of investments considerably 
more than their elders do.152 The Financial Times recently summarized that 
research as follows:  
US Trust found 75 per cent of wealthy millennials “consider the social and 
environmental impact of the companies they invest in to be an important 
part of investment decision-making.” Two-thirds “view their investment 
decisions as a way to express their social, political, or environmental 
values.” Similarly, according to a survey by Morgan Stanley, “millennials 
are twice as likely to invest in a stock or a fund if social responsibility is 
part of the value-creation thesis.” A report by Fidelity says “a majority of 
affluent millennials (77 per cent) and Generation X donors (72 per cent) 
indicated they had made some form of impact investment, such as 
investing in a publicly traded company with good social or environmental 
 
29, 2019, 4:42 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/millennials-wealth-generation-experts-data-2019-
1 [https://perma.cc/N8U4-LGJ6]. 
 150. See Kurz, Li & Vine, supra note 149, at 3. 
 151. Richard Fry, Young Adult Households Are Earning More than Most Older Americans Did at 
the Same Age, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/11/young 
-adult-households-are-earning-more-than-most-older-americans-did-at-the-same-age/?amp=1 [https://pe 
rma.cc/YY6R-LFLE].  
 152. NUVEEN, THIRD ANNUAL RESPONSIBLE INVESTING SURVEY: INVESTOR INTEREST IN 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTING SOARS (2018), https://www.tiaa.org/public/pdf/investor_interest_in_responsibl 
e_investing_soars.pdf [https://perma.cc/J898-BFR3].  
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practices.” Among the Baby Boomer and older generation the ratio was a 
mere 30 per cent.153   
 
 153. Tett, supra note 15.  
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TABLE 1.  Survey Results from the Third Annual Responsible Investor 
Survey Conducted by Nuveen 







1103* 197 815 
I tend to recycle everyday 
88% 
86%* 93% 86% 
I’d like to work for an employer that  
   makes a positive social impact on  
   the world 
76% 
73%* 91% 70% 
I prefer to use reusable bags, rather  
   than paper or plastic, because it is  
   more environmentally sustainable 
76% 
71%* 91% 70% 
I’d like to work for an employer that  
   makes a positive impact on the  
   world 
76% 
70%* 92% 70% 
The Recession has made me more  
   financially conservative than  
   previous generations 
76% 
72%* 89% 70% 
I prefer to shop for brands that have  
   environmentally sustainable  
   business practices 
72% 
61%* 90% 64% 
Given today’s political climate, I  
   prefer to invest in ways that will  
   positively impact the environment 72% 95% 63% 
I grew up learning to care for the  
   environment from TV shows,  
   books and my parents 
69% 
60%* 93% 59% 
I care more about having a positive  
   impact on society than doing well  
   financially 
64% 
49%* 92% 52% 
Notes: Survey results from 2017; * survey results from 2015 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516
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Similarly, in 2015 and again in 2017, Morgan Stanley conducted online 
surveys of eight hundred investors, a quarter of whom were millennials.154 
The survey found that millennials were significantly more likely to invest in 
companies or funds that target specific social or environmental outcomes, 
and more than twice as likely to exit an investment position because of 
objectionable corporate activity.155 In its 2017 survey, Morgan Stanley found 
that millennials are the driving force in the adoption of socially responsible 
investment strategies.156  
We have found effectively no research refuting the notion that 
millennial attitudes differ from those of prior generations. Most of the 
resistance to the millennials thesis comes either from the idea that their future 
financial power has been overestimated, as noted above, or because of the 
failure of some businesses to profit from socially responsible investment 
strategies that cater to millennials. For example, Pacific Life Insurance Co. 
launched a socially conscious online investing platform in 2015 called Swell 
Investing. However, it closed on August 30, 2019 after failing to attract 
enough customers.157 Some might suggest that the millennial market for 
socially responsible investment products has been exaggerated. However, at 
least one reason for Swell’s closure is that “[g]iants like BlackRock Inc. and 
The Vanguard Group . . . have attracted billions in ESG assets after dramatic 
price cuts on new socially-conscious ETFs.”158 Swell’s closing could just as 
easily be seen as evidence supporting our hypothesis, not refuting it. 
It is also possible that millennial investment attitudes will change over 
time. Perhaps as this generation ages, it will become more conservative and 
 
 154. MORGAN STANLEY INST. SUSTAINABLE INV., SUSTAINABLE SIGNALS: NEW DATA FROM THE 
INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR 3 (Aug. 2017) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE SIGNALS 2017], https://www.morgan 
stanley.com/pub/content/dam/msdotcom/ideas/sustainable-signals/pdf/Sustainable_Signals_Whitepape 
r.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN7H-9PWM].  
 155. Id. at 5, 5 fig.3; see also MORGAN STANLEY INST. SUSTAINABLE INV., SUSTAINABLE SIGNALS: 
THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 1, 4 (Feb. 2015), http://www.fairtrade.travel/source/websites/ 
fairtrade/documents/Sustainable_Signals_Morgan_Stanley_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NRR-NQTR].  
 156. SUSTAINABLE SIGNALS 2017, supra note 154.  
 157. Ryan W. Neal, Pacific Life Shutters ESG Robo-Adviser Swell Investing, INV. NEWS (July 25, 
2019), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190725/FREE/190729956/pacific-life-shutters-esg-r 
obo-adviser-swell-investing [https://perma.cc/ZW43-2V26] (citing Swell spokesman’s comment that 
“the company was not able to achieve the necessary scale in the current market to sustain operations”). 
 158. See Emily Chasan, Pacific Life Lost the Bet on Socially Minded Millennials, BLOOMBERG (July 
26, 2019, 7:36 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-26/pacific-life-s-bet-on-social 
ly-minded-millennials-didn-t-pay-off [https://perma.cc/9DYY-PFLT].  
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its preferences will change. But the funds are looking to recruit millennial 
clients now, and we believe this is what explains their pursuit of these 
initiatives currently. It could be that the funds will change course if 
millennial attitudes change or if the generation that follows millennials has 
different preferences. Our point is that the funds’ behavior is geared toward 
winning those millennial clients now by catering to their preferences now. 
Perhaps more potently, the funds are portraying these efforts as cohering 
with traditional investment preferences, often by arguing that pursuing ESG 
priorities is actually value maximizing.159 In that instance, the socially 
responsible choice is really no choice at all. ETF.com’s Dave Nadig says that 
“[t]he No. 1 question I get from advisers is how to handle the coming 
generational wealth transfer . . . some $30 trillion that will make its way from 
the baby boomers to millennials in the coming two decades. ESG has 
emerged as one of the dominant answers to that question.”160 
Millennials’ behavior in other contexts—as employees and as 
consumers—supports the argument that they are more likely to respond to 
social issues than prior generations and is certainly playing a role in how 
mutual fund complexes will court their business. 
1.  Millennials as Employees 
Within two years, millennials are predicted to cross a significant 
threshold: they will comprise 50 percent of the workforce, a figure the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics projects will rise to 75 percent by the year 2030.161 
Already, that demographic change is having significant effects in the 
workplace. Some recent case studies illustrate the point. 
 
 159. See, e.g., BLACKROCK INV. INST., SUSTAINABLE INVESTING: A ‘WHY NOT’ MOMENT 3, 6 
(May 2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/bii-sustainable-investing-may-
2018-international.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7TN-NUAX] (“ESG investing is not just about doing good. A 
growing body of research points to a link with asset performance. Companies that manage sustainability 
risks and opportunities well tend to have stronger cash flows, lower borrowing costs and higher 
valuations. . . . Good governance translates to lower corporate risk, we believe, and in turn, a lower cost 
of doing business. Findings are similar for environmental and social risk management . . . .”). 
 160. See MSCI, supra note 147, at 2. 
 161. See Mark Emmons, Key Statistics About Millennials in the Workplace, DYNAMIC SIGNAL, 
https://dynamicsignal.com/2018/10/09/key-statistics-Millennials-in-the-workplace [https://perma.cc/N4 
AQ-96BJ]; Richard Fry, Millennials Are the Largest Generation in the U.S. Labor Force, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/11/Millennials-largest-generation-us-
labor-force [https://perma.cc/MW6M-FXVX]. 
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Wayfair is a Boston-based furniture manufacturing and distribution 
company.162 Its employees recently discovered that the company had entered 
into a $200,000 contract with BCFS Health and Human Services to supply 
bedroom furniture to an immigrant detention center at the U.S.-Mexico 
border.163 Hundreds of employees signed a letter to the company’s leadership 
team requesting that it cease all business with BCFS and others supplying 
detention centers and that it craft a code of conduct “that empowers Wayfair 
and its employees to act in accordance with our core values.”164 For our 
purposes, it is noteworthy that the signers identified themselves as “company 
employees and shareholders.”165 The company responded that it was “proud 
to have such an engaged team that is focused on impacting our world in 
meaningful and important ways”166 but restated its policy of fulfilling all 
lawful orders. This did not satisfy the employees, who staged a walkout.167 
A week before the walkout, Wayfair’s stock was trading at $162.47,168 but 
by June 26, the date of the walkout, the stock had dropped more than 10 
percent to $145.81.169 Immediately before the walkout, Wayfair donated 
$100,000 to the American Red Cross, but this did not mollify the 
protesters.170 The day of the walkout, Forbes ran an article, “3 Reasons To 
Sell Wayfair On Today’s Employee Walkout,” arguing, among other things, 
that the company had engaged in “weak cost-benefit analysis” by concluding 
that “angering its employees and tarnishing its brand were costs that were 
smaller than the $86,000 in profit it will generate from the . . . contract” and 
that it “put[] Wayfair into a political firestorm that could damage its brand” 
 
 162. See Meghan B. Kelly & Laney Ruckstuhl, Wayfair Employees Protest Sale of Furniture to 
Migrant Detention Center, NPR (Jun. 26, 2019, 3:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/26/736308620/ 
wayfair-employees-protest-sale-of-furniture-to-migrant-detention-center [https://perma.cc/8EN2-EU6 
6]. 
 163. Id. 
 164. @sun_daiz, TWITTER (June 25, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://twitter.com/sun_daiz/status/1143548 
274240102401 [https://perma.cc/T6LA-WZEA]; see also Kelly & Ruckstuhl, supra note 162. 
 165. @sun_daiz, supra note 164. 
 166. Kelly & Ruckstuhl, supra note 162. 
 167. Id.; Cristina Alesci, Nathaniel Meyersohn & Kate Trafecante, Wayfair Donates $100,000 to 
the Red Cross After Employee Backlash, CNN (June 26, 2019, 3:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/ 
26/business/wayfair-donation-migrant-facility/index.html [https://perma.cc/TAH4-52MH].  
 168. See Wayfair Inc. (W), YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/W [https://perma.cc/U 
MS6-5KYP]. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Alesci, Meyersohn & Trafecante, supra note 167. 
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and “make it harder for Wayfair to attract and retain talented employees.”171 
The sides remain at an impasse over the issue. 
Other examples of this worker-driven activism are easy to find. Google 
employees recently protested a company project with the Chinese 
government to develop a search engine that would censor sensitive 
information and facilitate surveillance.172 Microsoft and Amazon employees 
have acted similarly.173 These episodes reflect observable trends, much as 
the new index fund activism reflects those trends on the investor side. 
According to a recent study by communications and marketing firm 
Weber Shandwick, millennials play a particularly prominent role in this new 
employee-driven activism.174 Among other things, the study asked 
employees whether they had “spoken up to support or criticize their 
employer’s actions over a controversial issue that affects society.”175 Thirty-
eight percent of employees said yes.176 But among millennials, 48 percent 
said yes, compared to 33 percent of Generation Xers and 27 percent of baby 
boomers.177 Seventy percent of millennial employees agreed with the 
statement, “employees can make a difference by speaking out on 
controversial issues that affect society” compared to 68 percent and 65 
percent of Generation Xers and baby boomers, respectively.178 Seventy 
percent of millennials agreed with the statement, “employees can make an 
even greater impact on our world than leaders who run organizations,” 
 
 171. Peter Cohan, 3 Reasons to Sell Wayfair on Today’s Employee Walkout, FORBES (June 26, 2019, 
8:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2019/06/26/3-reasons-to-sell-wayfair-on-todays-em 
ployee-walkout/#2eebe440492f [https://perma.cc/XS23-PAAS]. 
 172. Rakeen Mabud, Two Lessons From the Wayfair Walkout, FORBES (July 12, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rakeenmabud/2019/07/12/two-lessons-from-the-wayfair-walkout/#64233 
96c3a88 [https://perma.cc/2H9C-PND9]. 
 173. See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel, Microsoft Employees Question C.E.O. Over Company’s Contract 
with ICE, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/technology/microsoft-ice-
immigration.html [https://perma.cc/5D6C-NSP3]; Emily Stewart & Alexia Fernández Campbell, 8,000 
Amazon Employees Asked the Company to Do More on Climate Change. Shareholders Just Said No., 
VOX (May 22, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/22/18635604/amazon-shareholder-
meeting-2019-climate-change-proposal [https://perma.cc/JSB8-JDB7].  
 174. See WEBER SHANDWICK ET AL., EMPLOYEE ACTIVISM IN THE AGE OF PURPOSE: EMPLOYEES 
(UP)RISING, 5 (2019), https://www.webershandwick.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Employee-Activi 
sm-in-the-Age-of-Purpose-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3KL-QD7T].  
 175. Id. at 8. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 5. 
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compared to 60 percent of Generation Xers and 54 percent of baby 
boomers.179 Thus, like millennial investors, millennial employees feel 
empowered, believe that activism can make a difference, have themselves 
participated in activism, and see the workplace as an appropriate and 
necessary forum for activism. It is easy to imagine these same employees 
demanding ESG activism by their investment managers. 
2.  Millennials as Consumers 
There are also consumer-side examples of how rapidly a company can 
enter into a near-death spiral by tarnishing its brand.  
Papa John’s, a once-thriving company, suffered massive business harm 
after its founder was publicly accused of making racist comments. The saga 
began when its CEO, board chair, and founder John Schnatter criticized the 
National Football League for showing “poor leadership” in dealing with 
football players who kneeled during the national anthem as a form of 
political protest.180 Schnatter, who had donated one thousand dollars to the 
Trump presidential campaign, argued that the protests should have been 
“nipped in the bud” during the preseason rather than allowed to grow.181 
Papa John’s was the most recognized NFL sponsor at the time and advertised 
heavily during games, so Schnatter blamed the company’s sagging sales on 
the reduced viewership of NFL games caused by the kneeling controversy.182 
Schnatter’s comments drew all the wrong kinds of attention to the company. 
First, rivals DiGiorno and Pizza Hut engaged in a “Twitter war” with the 
company, mocking its declining sales.183 Worse, in response to Schnatter’s 
remarks, white supremacist website The Daily Stormer named Papa John’s 
“the official pizza of the alt-right.”184 As a result, Schnatter announced that 
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he would step down as the company’s CEO, though he retained his role as 
board chair.185 The following July, Forbes reported that Schnatter used a 
racial slur on a conference call in May.186 This explosive scandal, following 
Schattner’s troubling comments from the prior winter, had a devastating 
effect on the company. Sales dropped 7.1 percent for the year and 8.1 percent 
in the fourth quarter.187 Fourth quarter income dropped from $22.8 million 
the prior year to $4.6 million.188 
The company’s response to the decline in sales reveals its diagnosis of 
the problem. In March 2019, its new CEO, Steve Ritchie, announced the 
launch of a TV and digital marketing campaign to “show Papa John’s leaning 
into the story of our products and ingredients and doing it in a way that is 
relevant to millennial and Gen Z consumers” in an attempt to “ensure the 
new generation of pizza consumers understand [sic] the quality foundation 
of our brand so that we can attract new customers.”189  
Other examples include the rapid collapse into bankruptcy of the once 
storied film studio, The Weinstein Company, after several dozen women 
accused company CEO and co-founder Harvey Weinstein of sexual 
harassment, assault, or rape.190 Alternatively, other examples also include 
more positive steps to signal social responsibility on the consumer side. For 
example, in direct opposition to the Papa John’s scandal, Nike launched an 
ad campaign featuring Colin Kaepernick, the most prominent kneeling 
football player who was largely credited with starting the protest (and whose 
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career ended because of it).191 Dick’s Sporting Goods decided to stop selling 
guns, and Bank of America recently announced it would not finance private 
prisons or detention centers.192 
In our view, each of these companies concluded that the marketing 
benefits outweighed the costs of giving up certain businesses or associating 
themselves with particular political movements. Index funds are facing 
similar calculations.  
3.  Millennials as Investors 
Developments in the investment world outside the context of index 
funds provide additional evidence of the market responding to the looming 
entry of millennials. In addition to deploying existing and previously unused 
voting power to advance ESG goals, funds are also creating new financial 
products to meet millennial demand. For the first time, BlackRock and Wells 
Fargo are developing ESG funds for retirement savings plans, specifically 
target-date retirement funds for use in 401(k) plans.193 BlackRock’s plan 
launched in 2018.194 Bloomberg reported that assets in ESG funds rose 37 
percent in 2017.195 As reported by Investment News: “The move is aimed at 
spurring reluctant millennials to invest more for retirement. There’s evidence 
that a younger generation of investors want such options and have yet to 
create a nest egg for the future.”196 Not surprisingly, the other big two have 
done the same, with State Street having created its SPDR SSGA Gender 
Diversity Index ETF and Vanguard having similarly created a long list of 
ESG ETFs for both U.S. and international stocks.197 
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A list of recently related financial products targeting this space drives 
the point home. As Marketwatch describes it, in an article titled, Millennials 
Have More Money than You Think—So Expect ESG Funds in Your 401(k): 
Want a low carbon footprint? The SPDR S&P 500 Fossil Fuel Reserves 
Free, the iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF, or the American 
Funds New Economy Fund could be worth a look. 
Want more social justice? The Impact Shares NAACP Minority 
Empowerment ETF, SPDR SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF, or the 
Pax Ellevate Global Women’s Leadership Fund are just a few options 
available. 
Interested in supporting companies with good environmental, social and 
governance characteristics? The Parnassus Endeavor Fund, the iShares 
MSCI USA ESG Select ETF, or one of Vanguard’s new ESG ETFs—the 
Vanguard ESG US Stock ETF, and the Vanguard ESG International Stock 
ETF—are a few of a growing number of fund offerings. . . . 
In short, if millennial investors want to invest responsibly through their 
employer’s retirement offering or from the comfort of their parents’ 
basement, a growing number of them can, and likely will.198 
Interestingly, as a reflection of the long-term thinking deployed by 
those who are creating these products, all of them have low investment 
minimums, with the ETF funds requiring purchase of no more than one 
share.199 We think this is further evidence of our contention that the funds 
anticipate a massive future wealth transfer, that they believe at least one way 
to reach millennials is through socially responsible investment, and that the 
time to do so is now, explaining the funds’ current activism. 
Other, smaller transactions similarly reflect the funds’ interest in 
millennials and socially responsible investing. For example, BlackRock 
recently acquired a stake in Acorns, an app that invests spare change.200 Its 
stated purpose in so doing is to give BlackRock “insight into the behavior of 
a [sic] younger investors, so it can develop products to suit their needs down 
the line. The company is also fleshing out its suite of ethical and sustainable 
investing funds, which it expects to appeal to younger clients.”201  
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Unsurprisingly, index fund ESG voting patterns and product generation 
directly reflect the views of the executives who are running these 
organizations. This was confirmed by a recent survey of 70 senior executives 
at 43 investment firms, including leaders at the big three, large public 
pension funds like CalPERS and CalSTRS, and the government pension 
funds of Japan, Sweden, and the Netherlands.202 Quoting Cyrus 
Taraporevala, president and CEO of State Street:  
ESG issues have become much more important for us as long-term 
investors . . . . We seek to analyze material issues such as climate risk, 
board quality, or cybersecurity in terms of how they impact financial value 
in a positive or a negative way. That’s the integrative approach we are 
increasingly taking for all of our investments.203  
The self-reporting by these ESG managers is supported by the data:  
In 2006, when the UN-backed Principles for Responsible Investment 
(PRI) was launched, 63 investment companies (asset owners, asset 
managers, and service providers) with $6.5 trillion in assets under 
management (AUM) signed a commitment to incorporate ESG issues into 
their investment decisions. By April 2018, the number of signatories had 
grown to 1,715 and represented $81.7 trillion in AUM. According to a 
2018 global survey by FTSE Russell, more than half of global asset 
owners are currently implementing or evaluating ESG considerations in 
their investment strategy.204 
Interestingly, the survey also concluded that corporate managers tend 
to underestimate the extent to which their investors are committed to ESG 
investing. Corporate managers estimate that responsible investors constitute 
roughly 5 percent of their shareholder base when in fact that actual 
percentage is closer to 25 percent.205 The disconnect between manager 
perception and the underlying investor reality is the space in which this new 
index fund activism operates. To some extent, much of the activism we 
describe is dedicated to closing that gap, deploying the massive shareholder 
voting power of index funds to push companies to orient their activities in 
the direction their customers want. Finally, and most relevant for our 
purposes, the survey observes that, “the workforce is increasingly made up 
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of Millennials, for whom ESG is central to any business analysis.”206 One 
survey respondent summed it up: “They expect us to integrate sustainability 
as a natural part of our daily work.”207 
*** 
The weight of the evidence suggests we are at the beginning of a 
massive wealth transfer from baby boomers to millennials and that 
millennials’ attitudes toward investment are sharply different from those of 
prior generations. In the next Part, we show that the large index funds are 
creating a new values-driven corporate governance and argue that a complete 
picture of index funds’ approach to corporate governance must take account 
of these incentives. 
IV.  THE NEW MILLENNIALS’ CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The existing theory of index funds’ approach to corporate governance, 
as developed in the literature, cannot explain why index funds have acted so 
aggressively to promote diversity on boards. Our argument is that the 
observed behavior of the big three index fund advisors across all governance 
matters, both conventional and social, can only be explained by enriching 
the incentive picture to account for index funds’ pressure to respond to the 
social values of millennial investors. Index funds act because action signals 
responsiveness to millennials’ values. Index funds will worry about 
governance when governance issues are salient (or can be made salient 
through marketing) to their investors. And it is no surprise that index funds 
are the leaders here: it is precisely because index funds cannot compete on 
returns that they face pressure to be particularly responsive to social issues. 
In an industry full of interchangeable indexed products, branding and 
customer affinity loom large. 
A.  INDEX FUNDS AND MILLENNIALS’ SOCIAL VALUES: A HIGH STAKES 
COMPETITION 
The existing literature correctly notes that index funds have, at most, 
fairly weak incentives to invest in governance, but in contrast to both Fisch, 
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Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon208 and Kahan and Rock,209 we argue that 
they face fierce, high stakes competition from each other over their ability to 
fulfill the social goals of their investors, particularly millennials. This 
competition is one in which, as the Papa John’s case indicates, if an advisor 
missteps, it could lose everything. If millennials perceive that a fund does 
not promote social values, it may lose a branding advantage forever.  
As discussed above, index funds cannot differentiate themselves from 
their indexed competitors by creating value through conventional 
governance interventions to generate superior returns.210 But if index funds 
cannot gain an edge through enhanced performance, this does not mean that 
the big three will simply stand pat; they will seek a competitive edge 
elsewhere. Price competition is an obvious place to look, but the large index 
funds are already so inexpensive that competition on price is approaching a 
natural limit, and of course cutting prices reduces profitability. By 
aggressively and publicly staking out a progressive position on board 
diversity, index funds credibly signal that they are in tune with millennial 
values and differentiate themselves from less aggressive competitors.  
Each index fund faces pressure to make sure it is not perceived as less 
committed to social values than its competitors. To secure and enhance its 
reputation, each fund will seek to be a first mover on social goals, or, if 
caught being a second mover, to adopt a more robust policy than the first 
mover. To credibly signal their commitment, funds will pursue these goals 
through voting policies and other forms of activism, even at the cost of 
alienating management. Finally, we expect them to publicize evidence of 
those efforts and their methods for obtaining them. All of this is entirely 
consistent with index funds’ observed behavior. The importance of this 
phenomenon should be emphasized: the aggregation of vast sums of money 
in index funds has given index funds substantial voting power. Index funds’ 
status as essentially commoditized financial assets means that they must seek 
a competitive edge where they can find it.  
The remarkable result is that the most important shareholders in our 
economy are now beholden to the social values of the up-and-coming 
generation of investors. Decades ago, shareholders were so dispersed and 
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ineffective that managers ran roughshod over their interests, whereas now 
we appear to be entering a world in which funds cannot only discipline 
managers, but that discipline must be responsive to the non-economic 
preferences of investors. In recent years, much ink has been spilled 
lamenting the relative dominance of the corporate world over our politics—
the classic tension between Wall Street and Main Street. But the political 
polls are not the only ballot boxes; investors may now be waking up to the 
reality that, to a significant degree, political issues have investment 
implications and will play out more directly in markets.  
This development may reshape corporate governance. The market for 
index fund assets is fiercely competitive, and the big three are enormous. 
Index fund advisors have incentives to identify areas where investor 
preferences are strong and develop engagement campaigns focused on those 
areas. Other funds will feel pressure to follow suit or risk losing investors. 
Index fund social activism may be about branding, but it is not cynical or 
superficial. Rather, it is a response to a complex, but robust, set of economic 
incentives. It is the market for asset management, and the need to be 
responsive to millennial values that motivates index funds.  
Another reason that index funds will be the leaders here is that they 
have fewer conventional money management worries than investors that try 
to beat the market. Because index funds are largely indifferent to returns, 
they are better positioned to respond to the preferences of their investors 
without worrying about whether those preferences might negatively affect 
firm value. If pressing firms to conduct themselves in a socially responsible 
way is a drag on share price, that is of little consequence to index funds that 
sell only market-tracking performance in any case.  
However, these incentives to be responsive to investor demands sit 
within a nexus of other pressures. The existing consensus on index funds’ 
incentives is not incorrect, just incomplete: index funds really do have 
incentives to avoid confrontation with management and underinvest in 
stewardship, and they do not benefit substantially from higher returns in their 
portfolio companies.211 The fear of confronting management may explain 
index funds’ more cautious approach to climate change so far. While 
millennials care about both diversity and climate, the gender composition of 
a corporate board is a far less sensitive issue for most firms than their carbon 
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footprint. Index funds intervene aggressively when the cost is low and tread 
lightly when it is not. 
The current literature focuses on whether fund managers have 
incentives to invest in corporate governance to increase shareholder returns. 
As outlined in more detail in Section I.C, index fund incentives to invest in 
stewardship are limited.212 First, even if an engagement improves returns, the 
improvement is likely to be quite small.213 Second, increased returns inure 
to the benefit of all shareholders, but only the activist bears the cost.214 
Finally, there is also the threat of retaliation from corporate managers.215 
Thus, current literature on index funds argues that their activism will be 
minimal and focused on those cases in which it could generate high 
shareholder returns.  
Our theory is a critical contribution to the literature because it explains 
observable fund behavior that otherwise remains puzzling. Current 
scholarship mostly focuses on the historical fact that index funds have 
remained passive. We do not challenge the historical view; we agree that, 
even today, funds remain passive across most of their portfolios with respect 
to most issues. But the existing literature, designed to explain the reticence 
of index funds, fails to explain the sharp move toward activism that we 
observe in certain areas by dismissing it as insignificant or by stressing that 
it is somehow anomalous or a quixotic departure from the norm. However, 
this move toward activism, though so far narrow in scope, is new, real, 
important, and a glimpse into the future. The existing literature’s failure to 
focus on it or explain it is rooted in the literature’s historically narrow focus 
on returns alone. This new activism is not about returns, and it is therefore 
insufficient to try to explain it by focusing on returns. Millennial corporate 
governance is rooted in shareholder values, not shareholder value. 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 2037 (“Index fund managers, however, are remunerated with a very small percentage of 
their assets under management and thus would capture a correspondingly small fraction of such increases 
in value. They therefore have much more limited incentives to invest in stewardship than their beneficial 
investors would prefer.”). 
 214. Id. (“[I]f stewardship by an index fund manager increases the value of a portfolio company, 
rival index funds that track the same index (and investors in those funds) will receive the benefit of the 
increase in value without any expenditure of their own.”).  
 215. Id. (“[W]e show that they have incentives to be excessively deferential—relative to what would 
best serve the interests of their own beneficial investors—toward the preferences and positions of the 
managers of portfolio companies.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516
  
2020] SHAREHOLDER VALUE(S) 1307 
 
B.  THE DYNAMICS OF INDEX FUND INCENTIVES: FIRST MOVER 
ADVANTAGE AND ESCALATING INTERVENTION 
The most famous recent example of an index fund becoming a 
prominent first mover on a social issue was State Street’s’ 2017 
announcement of a new gender diversity voting policy in which it would vote 
against nominating committee chairs on boards that had no female 
directors.216 In conjunction with this robust new policy, State Street also 
prominently unveiled the “Fearless Girl” statue on Wall Street.217 Unveiled 
around the time of the Women’s March, a protest against the election of 
Donald Trump, Fearless Girl rapidly became a cultural icon.218 It obtained 
an enormous amount of overwhelmingly positive press coverage, becoming 
a tourist destination in lower Manhattan and the subject of countless social 
media posts.219 It also introduced State Street and its voting policy to a new 
audience.  
BlackRock and Vanguard were caught flatfooted by State Street’s 
Fearless Girl marketing coup and its accompanying voting policy. There was 
little they could do to match that publicity, but now that State Street had so 
prominently raised the issue, they needed a response to answer to investors 
raising questions about where they stood on gender diversity. The answer 
quickly became, in essence, “we are doing more than State Street is.” In 
2018, BlackRock announced that it would vote against boards with fewer 
than two female directors, outdoing State Street’s own policy targeting all-
male boards.220  
This literal one-upswomanship is enormously difficult to explain by 
focusing on returns alone. The data on gender diversity and returns is mixed 
at best and the data on one woman versus two women on boards is virtually 
nonexistent given the small sample size. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
the kinds of active funds that might plausibly compete with the indexes were 
pushing this particular issue in this particular way. The diversity voting 
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policies applied across a large swath of investees with doubtful links to high-
value interventions.  
Finally, and most importantly, if announcing a new policy on gender 
diversity really is traditional activism focused on maximizing returns, then 
why not free ride? Why shouldn’t BlackRock tell its clients the good news 
that because State Street is bearing the cost of activism at the same firms 
BlackRock invests in, it can pass those cost savings along to the clients? 
Would that not be the rational thing to do from the perspective of returns? 
Far from free riding, BlackRock is increasing its own costs to engage in 
activism and make it more extreme than that of competitors, and further 
adding to its own costs by advertising and promoting that activism. In our 
view, the standard literature cannot explain either State Street’s initial move 
into this space or BlackRock’s subsequent escalation. There is little evidence 
that adopting such a policy helps (or hurts) returns. Here, too, our thesis 
explains what the existing literature does not.  
C.  MILLENNIAL INVESTORS AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO MANAGERIAL 
RETALIATION  
Another traditional explanation for index fund passivity is the threat of 
management retaliation.221 Public company employees’ 401(k) retirement 
funds are a critically important revenue source for index funds, and managers 
of those companies have a crucial source of leverage over index fund 
investors: final say over which funds to offer on their 401(k) platforms.  
Activism tends to alienate corporate boards and managers. By 
definition, managers work at the companies daily, they and their boards have 
access to inside information unavailable to investors, and they are often 
highly skilled and accomplished people. They often see activism as a threat 
to their leadership and authority and believe themselves best positioned to 
decide, for example, who should sit on the board. Among diversified 
investors, index funds and mutual funds generally have been far more 
passive than public pension funds and labor union funds, which file many 
more shareholder proposals and are also significantly more litigious than 
their index fund peers. At least part of the explanation for that activism gap 
lies in the fact that public pension funds and labor union funds are not 
simultaneously trying to solicit business from the very companies where they 
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engage in activist strategies. Unlike at pension funds and labor funds, boards 
and managers can retaliate against index funds by removing them from their 
401(k) platforms or never adding them in the first place. 
Evidence shows that threat of retaliation has at least partially explained 
mutual fund passivity.222 For the most part, we agree with the existing 
literature that the threat of managerial retaliation is real and induces index 
fund passivity. For example, index funds rarely, if ever, file shareholder 
proposals. In contrast to the diversity and environmental activism, they have 
been comparatively silent on the governance front, frequently voting in 
support of executive pay packages. (It is difficult to imagine a better way to 
trigger managerial retaliation than voting against its pay). That silence and 
passivity is ironic, given that as between E, S, and G, governance reform has 
the strongest claim to be value enhancing. 
Given the hostility to activism and the threat of managerial retaliation, 
we need an explanation for why the funds have become so active on these 
particular topics. As already argued, we do not think it can be explained by 
returns. Simply put, we think the index funds have identified socially 
responsible investment as a means of inducing millennials to save and 
attracting them as clients and the fear of missing out on managing the next 
generation’s wealth exceeds the fear of managerial retaliation, driving the 
observable activism and explaining ongoing passivity in other areas. Index 
funds remain passive on other issues of less importance to millennials and 
are only active where it counts.  
Simply put, we think the funds’ activism on diversity and the 
environment reflects a straightforward cost-benefit calculation. The threat of 
missing out on millennials and being named a bad actor outweighs the threat 
of managerial retaliation. Of course, it is true that the same forces to which 
the funds are responding reduce the risk of managerial retaliation—an all-
male board likely would not retaliate against an investment fund that pushed 
it to hire a woman precisely because such retaliation could backfire against 
the company, triggering a Papa John’s-like debacle. That likely gives the 
funds added comfort in staking out these activist positions.  
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Apart from competitive pressures, the funds’ social activism may have 
another purpose: inducing millennials to invest in the first place. To date, 
millennials have put less money into retirement funds than preceding 
generations.223 Connecting their social goals to saving for personal 
retirement may also be a way that the funds have identified, collectively, to 
speak to this new generation of investors and induce them either to begin 
saving for retirement, to increase their contributions to their retirement funds, 
or both. Put differently, the threat of management retaliation has eroded also 
because millennials are investing less in 401(k) plans and more in other ESG-
focused investments. 
D.  THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF MILLENNIAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
In arguing that index funds are responding to the preferences of 
customers in advancing board diversity and—to a lesser extent—the 
mitigation of climate change, it is important to emphasize that we do not 
regard index funds’ behavior as cynical or insincere. An equilibrium in 
which index funds feel genuine market pressure to respond to the values of 
their customers is likely a more robust and stable equilibrium than one in 
which fund managers simply happen to share those values. So long as index 
funds are backing their marketing with real, effective action, identifying 
funds’ social activism as a matter of seeking new customers is not meant to 
diminish its importance. In a sense, attention to social issues from 
institutional investors on behalf of retail clients will simply add to the list of 
stakeholders to whom modern managers, especially those of public-facing 
firms, will have to attend to. As noted above, firms already face pressure 
from customers and employees to demonstrate their bona fides when it 
comes to salient social issues. The effect of the developing dynamic in the 
index fund market will be to add investors to the list of constituencies that 
care about these issues. 
1.  The Promise of Index Fund Social Activism  
In our view, increased attention to social issues is likely to be a positive 
development in the sense that the assets of many small investors will 
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effectively be mobilized to promote issues that those investors care about. 
When this activism is well-targeted and effective, the result will be a 
tendency for companies to exhibit behavior that is more consistent with the 
widely shared values of the investor class, if not society at large. While index 
funds do not internalize the costs of social activism that might decrease share 
prices, investors do, and socially conscious investors are in a position to trade 
off their values against their concerns about returns. Index funds’ behavior 
should be expected to reflect this trade-off as aggregated across their 
customer base, as modified by the additional incentives that index funds have 
to not upset corporate management. While the net effect of this is naturally 
speculative, one would expect a modest increase in socially responsible 
behavior, even when costly, across a large number of firms.  
Index fund activism will also expand the list of companies giving 
attention to risks associated with salient social issues. It will come as no 
surprise—for example—that a large manufacturer of consumer goods must 
worry about the treatment of workers in its supply chain or risk consumer 
backlash, but companies in extractive industries or business-to-business 
firms have generally had less to worry about. The market-wide holdings of 
index funds mean that any large firm could conceivably have to address 
concerns about social issues coming not from the customer base, but from 
their beneficial owners.  
One important observation is that these effects are likely to be 
cumulative. Firms are simultaneously facing new pressures from customers, 
employees, and now investors as well. Firms that are not generally 
consumer-facing are often part of a supply chain for firms that are. Social 
media has increased the pace at which issues of social concern can become 
rallying points for stakeholders. Witness the timeframe in which an 
incendiary political comment from a talk show host can lead to calls for an 
advertiser boycott, for example. Increasingly, engagement—even 
indirectly—in unpopular commercial activities will create business risk that 
will steer firms away from anti-social conduct.  
2.  The Pitfalls of Index Fund Social Activism  
Index fund activism is not risk-free. The literature is correct in arguing 
that index funds have only weak incentives to be concerned about returns. 
So long as millennials’ preferences for social interventions reflect well-
thought out trade-offs between issues of social concern and firm value, then 
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index funds can be expected to mirror these preferences. But it may well be 
the case that some social preferences of millennials will have a more negative 
effect on firm value than anticipated, or that their preferred social 
interventions will be poorly thought out or not actually achieve the ends they 
seek, even as they have negative effects on firm value.  
The challenge of index fund social activism is that index funds have 
weak incentives to sort value-creating, worthwhile interventions from 
questionable ones that might nevertheless catch the popular imagination. 
While active funds might resist pressure to implement governance 
interventions that would be value-destroying while generating little public 
benefit, perhaps by proposing alternatives, index funds—given their 
incentive structure—may be more inclined to give investors what they want, 
even if it is ill advised. Given the power of index funds as shareholders, this 
is a potential concern. 
*** 
 In our view, millennial corporate governance is primarily a welcome 
development: investors’ assets will be mobilized to achieve goals that those 
investors, collectively, find important. However, social activism is not 
without risks to social welfare, and corporate law scholars should be attentive 
to the potential problems discussed above.  
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
The effect of competition for millennials’ dollars on corporate 
governance is only beginning to be realized and is likely to evolve over time. 
At this point, much of what can be said is necessarily speculation. In 
identifying this important set of incentives, we hope to open a line of inquiry 
rather than have the final word on the matter. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
frame some of the important implications of millennial corporate governance 
and provide a foundation for the debates to come.  
In this Part, we discuss the normative consequences of index fund social 
activism. First, we discuss the implications for funds as corporate monitors. 
We argue for a light regulatory touch when it comes to social activism, both 
from the Trump administration, which has attempted to rein in asset 
managers, and from those who advocate encouraging index funds to invest 
more in conventional corporate governance. Second, we discuss the 
implications for corporate law. While social activism as currently practiced 
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can be accommodated within the existing framework of corporate law, the 
consequences of a base of shareholders pressing to promote social goals 
raises interesting questions about fiduciary duties.  
A.  IMPLICATIONS FOR INDEX FUNDS’ STEWARDSHIP  
It has been suggested, as a result of index funds’ weak incentives to 
invest in corporate governance, that index funds should not be permitted to 
vote as shareholders at all or that their votes should be mechanically linked 
to the votes of other non-management shareholders.224 The argument is that 
allowing large institutions with no economic stake in the shareholder votes 
to nevertheless sway the outcome will dilute the power of hedge fund 
activists and other share owners with real exposure to firm performance.225 
In this provocative approach to solving the problem, index funds would 
simply be sidelined as important shareholders.  
One of the contributions of our analysis is to throw into stark relief what 
would be lost with such an approach. If index funds are treated as non-
entities when it comes to voting their proxy, then their social activism would 
have no leverage, except perhaps as public advocacy. As described above, it 
was precisely State Street’s and BlackRock’s threats, backed by action, to 
vote against directors who did not show progress on gender diversity that 
pressed recalcitrant firms to act. Without the serious consequences of “no” 
votes for directors, it is not at all clear that firms would have responded to 
merely rhetorical pressure. After all, the lack of diversity has been a subject 
of discussion for years.  
Another proposal to address index funds’ perceived lack of governance 
diligence is to require index funds to pass through their voting rights to 
investors.226 If index funds have poor incentives, then perhaps allowing 
investors to vote their own interests would solve the problem. This solution 
is perhaps more initially attractive in light of index fund social activism 
because it would permit investors themselves to press their interests. In our 
view, though, handing proxies over to retail investors would be likely to 
greatly reduce the effectiveness of social activism campaigns because index 
fund shareholders would face a near-insurmountable collective action 
 
 224. See Lund, supra note 3, at 528. 
 225. Id. at 529–30. 
 226. Id. at 530. 
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problem. One of the reasons that index fund social activism has been 
effective is that it has been focused on specific goals at specific times: State 
Street was able to make gender diversity the issue for boards in 2017, just as 
BlackRock is now pressing sustainability. By leveraging the full voting 
power of the fund to achieve a specific end, index funds are able to maximize 
their (and their investors’) leverage. A pass-through voting arrangement 
would squander this advantage.  
A number of options for increasing index funds’ investment in 
stewardship have been suggested, including making index fund stewardship 
expenditures mandatory, passing through costs to investors, and prohibiting 
other business relationships with managers like managing 401(k) plans.227 
Each of these reforms would make it easier for index funds to undertake 
costly shareholder oversight without disadvantaging themselves in a market 
that is extremely price-sensitive as well as to reduce conflicts of interest that 
might stop them from challenging management. To be clear, these policies 
are meant to address the perceived underinvestment of index funds in 
stewardship with respect to traditional matters of shareholder value.  
Our argument suggests that caution is warranted in regulating index 
fund stewardship. Funds’ incentives are not as weak as they seem because 
funds have incentives to demonstrate governance diligence when such 
diligence is directly salient to investors. Since conventional matters of 
corporate governance are probably not salient, and in any case are subject to 
a substantial collective action problem, it is not unreasonable to think that a 
regulatory thumb on the scale is necessary with respect to some issues that 
investors are inattentive to. On the other hand, it is important to consider 
what the yardstick of effective stewardship should be. The evidence suggests 
that millennials explicitly subordinate profits to other social values. This 
does not mean that sound corporate governance practices, in the traditional 
sense, are irrelevant to them, but it does mean that index fund stewardship 
should not be evaluated strictly with respect to its commitment to increasing 
share value. Indeed, corporate governance structures that press managers to 
relentlessly pursue profits at the expense of social goals could be 
counterproductive for the interests of investors to whom both are important. 
As for regulations that would bar other business relationships with firms in 
index fund portfolios, eliminating this conflict of interest would make index 
 
 227. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2120–22.  
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funds more active on both conventional and social issues. Our contribution 
here is simply to point out that, at least with respect to social issues, the 
pursuit of millennial investors is a counterweight to the threat of managerial 
retaliation.  
We also object to the Trump administration’s push against social 
activism, at least as applied to mutual fund investments.228 While the 
guidance offered by DOL was couched in terms of protecting investors by 
focusing asset managers on returns, our argument suggests that index fund 
social activism is undertaken precisely out of a desire to operationalize 
investors’ preferences. In pressing funds to hew to the shareholder value 
maximization orthodoxy, DOL is pressing funds to act contrary to their 
investors’ preferences, and paradoxically couching that guidance in the 
language of fiduciary duty.  
A lingering objection is that not all shareholders in index funds share 
millennial values (needless to say, not all millennials share them either), and 
there are surely many who might prefer a more conventional approach to 
corporate governance. Should we worry that their assets are being 
appropriated to press an agenda that they do not share? In our view, the 
appropriate venue to settle such disputes is the marketplace for assets. If 
social activism originates in the fierce competition among funds for assets to 
manage, then that market has every potential to solve any excesses that 
result. An investor genuinely chagrined at State Street’s Fearless Girl 
campaign can simply move to another fund; they will find no shortage of 
options. If the big three fail to represent the aggregate preferences of 
investors, then new market entrants may seek assets offering different 
approaches to governance. Unless and until evidence of market failure arises, 
this new dynamic in the index fund market should be allowed to evolve.  
B.  IMPLICATIONS FOR HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM  
As discussed above, index funds have become the swing voters of hedge 
fund activism campaigns. Unlike index funds, hedge funds have huge 
monetary incentives to create value by intervening in corporate governance 
and can come and go as shareholders. The pressing question for hedge funds 
 
 228. Pension fund social activism is beyond the scope of this article, but see DAVID WEBBER, THE 
RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (2018), for a defense of 
activism in that context.  
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is whether the interventions they promote through their activist campaigns 
reflect long-term value creation or merely a short-term sugar-rush that lets 
hedge funds cash out while long term investors are left to clean up a long-
term mess.229 Since index funds are the quintessential long-term investor, 
they are well-positioned to evaluate whether a proposed hedge fund 
intervention is a good idea. The problem is their weak incentives to invest 
much effort in making an informed decision. As a result, the suggested 
interventions in the current literature, outlined in the foregoing Section, are 
aimed at increasing their incentive to evaluate campaigns.  
Understanding index funds’ incentives to demonstrate adherence to a 
particular set of social values, though, provides new insight into index funds’ 
approach to hedge fund activism. Many, though by no means all, 
interventions undertaken by hedge funds may create tension with the social 
goals of millennials. Hedge funds may advocate plant closures, layoffs, 
outsourcing, offshoring, and automation. There is evidence that much of the 
value created by hedge funds for shareholders reflects wealth transfers from 
labor.230 Under pressure to keep stock prices high to stave off activist 
campaigns, firms may be likely to slide on the longer-term values of 
environmental responsibility, sustainability, and workforce relations.  
Index funds’ incentives to court millennials may induce them to resist 
hedge fund campaigns that create tension with those values. For example, 
BlackRock’s public commitment to sustainability may well be aimed at 
putting certain types of hedge fund activists on notice that they should not 
expect BlackRock’s support. It is of course difficult to attribute an index 
fund’s decision to oppose a hedge fund activist campaign to a particular 
cause, but that is precisely our point: if commentators are not attentive to 
index funds’ incentives toward social values, then opposition to hedge fund 
 
 229. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think 
Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 8 (2010) (“[T]here is a danger that activist stockholders will make proposals 
motivated by interests other than maximizing the long-term, sustainable profitability of the corporation.”); 
cf. Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(arguing that activist hedge funds' pressure to produce short-term gains balances managers’ inclination to 
overestimate, and overinvest in, their long-term investments). 
 230. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: 
Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2723, 2726 (2015) (“The 
improvement in labor productivity coupled with relatively stable wages indicates that workers do not 
fully capture the value of productivity improvements but instead relinquish most of the surplus to equity 
investors after hedge fund intervention.”). 
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activism that is rooted in those values may be interpreted as pro-management 
bias instead. This would mistakenly create the impression that index funds 
are asleep at the switch when in reality, they are acting to vindicate investors’ 
interests, just not to maximize shareholder value.  
C.  THE CHALLENGE TO THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE PARADIGM 
So far, index funds’ activism around social values has been couched in 
the language of shareholder value, particularly in communications with 
management. State Street and BlackRock both cited an alleged consensus of 
research when launching their gender diversity campaigns, and action on 
environmental issues is framed in terms of investment risk. Their marketing 
is a different story: the Fearless Girl is standing defiantly, not holding a piggy 
bank. In fact, with respect to gender diversity in particular, our thesis is that 
index fund activism reflects a sincere commitment to social values, while the 
claimed profit motive is more tenuous. To be sure, our claim is not that index 
fund social activism cannot be defensibly framed in terms of value creation–
the evidence is legitimately ambiguous at this point. Rather, our claim is that 
shareholder value is not the true motivation. Put differently, if the empirical 
evidence mounted that firms that diversified boards in response to the 
Fearless Girl had measurable declines in stock price, would we expect the 
big three to reverse their demands?  
But what is the consequence for corporate law when the largest 
shareholders internalize other values alongside profit maximization? Since 
the beginning of the corporate governance literature, the touchstone of good 
governance has been value creation as measured by share price. Hundreds, 
if not thousands, of papers have used “Tobin’s Q,” which represents stock 
price adjusted by firm book value, as the key measurement of effective 
governance. This method of thinking is so ingrained into our thinking about 
firms that even the most hotly contested debates over features of firm 
governance internalize value-creation as the appropriate metric.  
The maximization of shareholder value is etched into law as well. There 
is of course Dodge v. Ford’s language that: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit 
of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for 
that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
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means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end 
itself . . . .231 
The case is often cited for the proposition that boards and managers 
have a legal obligation to maximize shareholder value.232 Similar language 
in the Delaware case eBay v. Newmark highlights the obligations of directors 
there: 
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are 
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. 
Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for 
the benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to 
mean at least that.233 
Dozens of other decisions make similar assertions. 
Nothing currently proposed or on the horizon for index fund social 
activism risks running afoul of corporate fiduciary duties, at least as a matter 
of creating liability. The business judgment rule gives blanket protection to 
any decision that can be framed, in good faith, as linked to shareholder value. 
Indeed, both Dodge v. Ford and Newmark are unique in that the defendants 
steadfastly refused to assert that their decisions were motivated by 
shareholder value when such assertions would have been at least facially 
plausible and the mere assertion of such reasons would have placed their 
decisions within the protection of the business judgement rule.234  
Nevertheless, when shareholders have sincere commitments to social 
values that may be in tension with profit maximization, the notion that the 
purpose of the corporation is to maximize profit comes under stress. Note 
the language in the quotations above: “for the profit of the stockholders” and 
“promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.” In 
each case, the court treats the claim that the firm is run for the benefit of the 
shareholders as implicitly equivalent to the claim that the firm must be run 
to profit the shareholders. However, if the goals of shareholders incorporate 
values other than profit, then the latter does not follow automatically from 
the former.  
 
 231. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 232. Whether the case actually demands this reading is disputed. See LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 25 (2012).  
 233. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 234. See Newmark, 16 A.3d at 32–33; Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
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As it happens, Delaware and other states have a corporate form that is 
designed to incorporate other goals. A public benefit corporation235 is a 
specialized variant of the corporation that, while still for-profit, “is intended 
to produce a public benefit or public benefits and to operate in a responsible 
and sustainable manner . . . . [A] public benefit corporation shall be managed 
in a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best 
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the 
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of 
incorporation.”236 Unsurprisingly, millennial-focused brands like Warby 
Parker and New Belgium Brewing are organized under public benefit 
corporation laws. No large public companies are organized as benefit 
corporations, though, and critics of index fund social activism might argue 
that it is therefore inappropriate to press these companies on social issues. 
Such an argument would effectively use the availability of the benefit 
corporation form as a cudgel to argue that conventional corporations must 
maximize profits. However, this is a misreading of the role of benefit 
corporations in the legal framework. To become a benefit corporation 
requires a supermajority vote, and for a benefit corporation to be acquired by 
an ordinary corporation also requires a supermajority vote. The benefit 
corporation form is essentially a takeover defense for firms that are 
consciously not value-maximizing and therefore might be vulnerable to 
activism aimed at increasing profits by abandoning their public mission.  
The notion that a corporation ought to give attention to the social values 
of its investors, particularly when the value impact is ambiguous, is far 
different than consciously subordinating profit to a public mission. The latter 
is far removed, not just from the current state of index fund social activism, 
but from anything on the horizon. Our argument is simply that the proper 
way to settle debates over the goals of an ordinary corporation, at least so 
long as those goals qualify for the protection of the business judgment rule, 
is through the shareholder franchise. Investors seeking increased recognition 
of social goals in an ordinary, for-profit firm ought to be free to press their 
case and vote for managers who are sympathetic to those goals and those 
seeking shareholder value maximization can do the same. Neither regulators 
nor judges need to settle the issue of what it means to run a corporation “for 
the benefit of its stockholders.”  
 
 235. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 361 et seq. (2020).  
 236. Id. § 362.  
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As a final point, it is worth distinguishing the dynamic we identify from 
existing rivals to the shareholder value account of corporate law. Many states 
have “other constituency” statutes that allow managers to consider the 
interests of non-shareholders when making certain decisions. In Delaware, 
the Unocal case permits firms facing a hostile takeover to consider its impact 
on non-shareholders, including the “community generally.”237 The 
stakeholder theory of the firm similarly pushes back against the notion of 
shareholders as the sole beneficiaries of the corporate form.238 However, 
each of these alternatives to shareholder value maximization subordinates 
the interests of shareholders to some other goal or constituency. Indeed, the 
subtitle of Professor Lynn Stout’s book on the subject is How Putting 
Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public.239  
Millennial corporate governance centered on shareholder values is 
subtly different than an “other constituency” account of running the firm. In 
index fund shareholder activism, shareholders are still the most important 
constituency, but it is not assumed that share value is the only value they care 
about. In this sense, this is a more conventional take on corporate governance 
than some of the extant alternatives. Nevertheless, a shareholder-centric 
theory of corporate law that incorporates social values—an “other values” 
rather than “other constituencies” approach—deserves deeper theorization.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The ongoing debate over index funds’ purported lack of activism has 
overlooked the dramatic ways in which index funds are, in fact, activist. 
Index funds are outspoken leaders on social issues. But more important than 
the fact of index funds’ social activism is the reason behind it: index funds 
face immense pressure from the next generation of investors to demonstrate 
commitment to the social values that millennials have already shown are 
important to them. Given the fierce competition among the big three and the 
stakes of winning over the new generation of investors, these pressures are 
likely only to increase. The issue of social values in investment management 
and corporate decision making cannot be ignored. In integrating the 
phenomenon of index fund social activism into the larger debate over index 
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funds as shareholders, we hope to begin the conversation regarding this new 
era in corporate governance. 
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